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THE AESTHETIC ACT AND THE ACT OF BEING
FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

THE SECOND MODE OF NECESSARY OR PER SE PROPOSITIONS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
WILLIAM M. WALTON

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THE AESTHETIC ACT AND THE ACT OF BEING

FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

The aesthetic experience has fascinated philosophers in all ages, but the need to explain the nature of this experience has become pressing only in modern times. The discovery that poetry is a kind of knowledge as well as a kind of art has placed philosophy under the necessity of formulating a metaphysics of the aesthetic experience as distinct from a metaphysics of the *habitus* of art.[1] Thomists, answering this challenge, have discovered in the text of St. Thomas a foundation to build such a doctrine upon. Though aesthetics, like the philosophy of history, is but germinal in the actual state of philosophical achievement, still, valuable work has already been accomplished, especially by M. Jacques Maritain.

This article is an essay into the cognitive aspect of the aesthetic act as it bears on the act of being in its fullest signification and into the analogy that art and metaphysics reveal in the *separatio entis;* and it is a brief consideration of the analogical imitability of being in the fine arts.

A contemporary Catholic poet has stated that the aesthetic experience is "a supra-rational intuition of the latent perfection of things."[2] Interestingly enough, St. Thomas himself speaks of perfection as being a basis of beauty, which is the object of the aesthetic

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[1]Cf. Jacques Maritain, *Frontières de la Poésie et Autres Essais* (Paris: Rouart et Fils, 1945), *passim;* Jacques et Raissa Maritain, *Situation de la Poésie* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), *passim.*

[2]Thomas Merton, "Poetry and the Contemplative Life," *Figures for an Apocalypse* (New York: New Directions, 1947), p. 102.

experience.[3] For the Angelic Doctor, *perfectio* means not simply being, but the fullness of being. Let us recall briefly that it is through its act of existing that any being tends to the fullness of its perfection,[4] for the very perfection of all perfections is the act of being.[5] Thus when St. Thomas establishes *pulchrum* in *bonum* he is establishing beauty in being itself. This is clearly his meaning, since he states that *perfectio* is of the very *ratio* of the beautiful; and *perfectio* for him is *bonum simpliciter,*[6] which is *ens secundum quid,*[7] the integrity of existence itself.[8] *Esse* is not only that by which being subsists, but is also that by which being tends,[9] that by which being tends to pass beyond itself in order to become itself.

If beauty is rooted in the act of being and if the aesthetic experience bears on the beautiful as such, then it would seem clear that the aesthetic experience, in its cognitive aspect, must belong to that act through which existence is grasped by man; namely, the judgment.[10] This sheds light on the somewhat controverted question as to whether or not the aesthetic experience—or the poetic experience, as it is often called—is conceptual. Since the first operation of the intellect has as its object the order of essence and since the order of essence is known by man as a result of an abstraction, this operation does not bear on the actual existing or the not existing of that which is apprehended.[11] Beauty, being linked intrinsically to the act of

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[3]"Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem integritas sive perfectio" (*Summa Theologiae,* I. 39. 8).

[4]"Ejusdem rationis sit tendere in finem, et in fine quodammodo quiescere. . . . Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi esse" (*De Veritate,* 21. 2).

[5]"Perfectio prima (est) secundum quod in suo esse constituitur" (*ST,* I. 6. 3); "intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens; esse enim est actualitas omnis rei" (*ibid.,* 5. 1); "hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum. . . . Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum" (*De Potentia,* 7. 2. 9). For the equivalence of *integritas* as well as *perfectio* with *esse,* cf. *In IV Lib. Sententiarum,* d. 26. 1. 4.

[6]"Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter" (*ST,* I. 5. 2 ad 1).

[7]*Ibid.*

[8]See nn. 4 and 5.

[9]*De Ver.,* 21. 2.

[10]For example, "prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius" (St. Thomas, *In I Sent.,* d. 19. 5. 1 ad 7). See Bernard Muller-Thym, "Music," *Fleur de Lis,* XXXVIII (1938-39), 51.

[11]Cf. St. Thomas, *In Boethii De Trinitate,* 5. 3; *In I Sent.,* d. 38. 1. 3.

being, cannot then be contemplated in function of simple apprehension; it is therefore nonconceptual in the sense that concepts are terminal products of the act of simple understanding. But is the aesthetic judgment in itself conceptual, in the sense that concepts enter the framework of judgment?

The answer to that question, a question crucial to any adequate philosophy of the poetic experience, can only be given within the metaphysics of St. Thomas's general doctrine on the judgment.[12] It is well known that for Aquinas formal truth is found only in the judgment. Formal truth follows on the existence of the thing known,[13] so that the act of being true is an act of intentional existing exercised by the predicate in the subject. This act is caused by, and proportionate to, the act of existing exercised by a form (designated by the predicate) in the supposit (designated by the subject).[14] The actual being attained in judgment is attained by means of a relation, so that the *in esse* of predicate in subject is an *esse ad.* Although the

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[12]Cf. Etienne Gilson, *L'Être et l'Essence* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 248-86; P. Hoenen, *La Théorie du Jugement d'après St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Rome: Univ. Gregoriana, 1946); B. Muller-Thym, "The 'To Be' Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XVI (1940), 230-54; George V. Kennard, S.J., "The Intellect Composing and Dividing according to St. Thomas Aquinas" (Unpublished Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of Saint Louis University, 1948). We are grateful to the author of the last work for permission to read his thesis; we are indebted to him for more than one insight.

[13]*Esse* is attained by man not by way of apprehension, because not by way of abstraction; the act of existing is attained by way of a relation of conformity. Through a relational act of existing the intellect is made like to the existence of the thing known. "Cum in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus" (*In I Sent.*, d. 19. 5. 1).

[14]"Hoc autem addit ad manifestandum quod supra dixerat, quod verum et falsum est in rebus componi et dividi. Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem, quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem intellectus compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam, aut ejus se quod habet per modum formae et materiae, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subjectum, respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis, compositioni, quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce" (*In IX Metaphysicorum*, lect. 11. n. 1898 [ed. Cathala]).

subject and predicate elements in judgment may have been terminal products of prior apprehensions, in this act they are not related as two separate *verba*. Since no potency can be in act to two species within the same genus in one and the same act, the intellect cannot be informed by two formally distinct intelligibilities in any one act of understanding. Any given act of knowing has one principle and one term. Two concepts, as two *verba* of two distinct acts of simple apprehension, simultaneously actuating the intellect is a metaphysical impossibility.[15] The judgment is rather an intelligible unity in which the extremes stand to one another as potency to act, matter to form, genus to difference. The entire intelligibility of any given judgment comes from the predicate, the subject having no formality of its own in this act.[16] The subject is but the intentional instrument of the

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[15]". . . ratio quam assignant philosophi, quare intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere, est haec, quia oportet quod intellectus figuretur specie rei intelligibilis. Impossibile autem est quod simul figuretur pluribus speciebus, sicut impossibile est quod corpus simul figuretur pluribus figuris. Et ideo si aliquae cognoscuntur per unam speciem, illa nihil prohibet simul cognosci; sicut homo intelligens quidditatem hominis, simul intelligit animal et rationale: et propter hoc etiam intelligens propositionem, simul intelligit praedicatum et subjectum, quia intelligit ea ut unum" (*In III Sent.*, d. 14. 1. 2. 4). "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter aliquid intelligit, scilicet primo, et ex consequenti. Ex consequenti quidem contingit plura simul intelligere, inquantum habent ordinem ad unum primum intelligibile; et hoc continget dupliciter. Uno modo ex unitate ejus quo intelligitur; sicut quando plura intelligibilia per unam speciem intelliguntur; sicut intellectus divinus omnia simul videt per unam essentiam suam; et eodem modo intellectus creatus, videns essentiam divinam, potest simul omnia videre quae per essentiam divinam videt. Alio modo ex unitate ejus quod intelligitur, scilicet quando plura intelliguntur ut unum; totum enim unum est primo intellectum, et illa plura sunt intellecta ex consequenti in illo; sicut intellectus intelligit lineam, simul intelligit partes lineae, ut dicitur in *III De Anima* (text. com. 25); et similiter cum intelligit propositionem intelligit simul subjectum et praedicatum; et cum intelligit similitudinem vel differentiam aliquorum, simul intelligit ea quorum est similitudo vel differentia. Sed quod intellectus simul intelligat plura intelligibilia est primo et principaliter impossibile, cujus ratio est, quia intellectus secundum actum est omnino, idest perfecte, res intellecta, ut dicitur in *III De Anima* (text. com. 36). Quod quidem intelligendum est, non quod essentia intellectus fiat res intellecta, vel species ejus, sed quia complete informatur per speciem rei intellectae, dum eam actu intelligit. Unde intellectum simul plura actu intelligere primo, idem est ac si res una simul esset plura" (*Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, 7. 2). Cf. *ST*, I. 34. 3 and 58. 2; *De Ver.*, 8. 14.

[16]"Si enim aliqua duo ita se habeant quod unum sit ratio intelligendi aliud, unum eorum erit quasi formale, et aliud quasi materiale; et sic illa duo sunt unum intelligibile, cum ex forma et materia unum constituatur. Unde intellectus quando intelligit aliquid per alterum, intelligit unum tantum intelligibile" (*De Ver.*, 8. 14 ad 6). "Praedicatum autem

intellect through which the intellect grasps its object, which is seen under the formality of the predicate. To the subject functioning as *thing* the intellect applies a formality functioning as predicate. Both subject and predicate stand to one intelligible species as to their principle, so that the resultant unity is analogous to the unity of matter and form. The predicate, although not a *verbum* in this act, is like that *verbum* which is called the concept insofar as it is a certain formal intelligibility; it is unlike the concept insofar as it is not a *verbum* in itself, but is rather the intrinsic formality of a *verbum* which is the entire judgment.

Normally the predicate, expressing the order of essence, specifies and limits the act of being which is always affirmed or denied in judgment. In the aesthetic judgment no essential determination of being, generic or specific, is predicated. The predicate—"is beautiful"—affirms a transcendental; that is, a mode of being following being simply.[17] Now, the act of being and those perfections following that act are not forms; rather, that very act is the act of all forms.[18] Thus the composition of predicate with subject, of form with matter, is in every judgment consequent upon, and posterior to, the affirmation of an act of existing.[19] The third adjacent judgment itself is dependent upon the second adjacent, expressing as it does the limitation essence puts on *esse;* but the judgment of a tran-

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est principalior pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis et completiva ipsius" (*In I Perihermeneias,* lect. 8 [ed. Leonine, no. 9]). "Sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo; nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea" (*ST,* I. 16. 2). "Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia sit unum simpliciter" (*In I Perih.,* lect. 8 [no. 11]).

[17]"Nihil est quod non participat pulchro. . . . Omnibus entibus creatis dat [Deus] pulchritudinem secundum proprietatem uniuscujusque" (Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus,* chap. i).

[18]Cf. *De Pot.,* 7. 2; *CG,* II. 54; *ST,* I. 4. 1 ad 3.

[19]"Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti: significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolutae: nam EST simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis; unde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subjecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum EST, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid; simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum EST significat compositionem" (*In I Perih.,* lect. 5, no. 22).

scendental expresses not limitation but relation. Since the formal intelligibility of this act is not a form limiting an act of being, the contemplated must be the act of existing itself, intuited somehow in and through, and as penetrating and actualizing, that being which possesses *esse* and which delights the beholder in the vision of the beautiful.

While not conceptual, the aesthetic act nevertheless is a *verbum,* a *verbum* of the second operation of the intellect. This intentional act bears on what is too rich for the abstractive intelligible species of man. A poet can point at what he sees; he cannot utter in a concept the being (*esse*) seen. To conceive the being contemplated aesthetically, one must reproject the experience into the work of art.[20]

If the metaphysics of the aesthetic experience is to be sought in the intuitive predication of a transcendental, the psychological location of the aesthetic judgment—its "geography," so to speak—is to be found in the phantasm and the relationship the phantasm bears to the subject element in judgment. Since the intelligible formality of any judgment is not the contribution of the subject, one can say with Dr. Muller-Thym that the role of the subject is "simply to indicate, as with the finger of the intellect, the thing subjected to predication."[21] The subject is closely related to the phantasm—held in the phantasm by the intellect, as it were. Now, the phantasm is not only that from which the intellect abstracts, that to which intellect reflects in predication, but also that with which the intellect symbolizes.[22] The power of man to form symbols lies in the ability of the agent intellect to order and select apt phantasms, that intellect

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[20]Maritain has developed this idea in many places, for instance, in *Frontières de la Poésie,* pp. 4-10 *et passim.*

[21]Muller-Thym, "Music," p. 51.

[22]St. Thomas identifies the application of predicate (formality) to subject (thing-suppositum) with reflexion upon the phantasm. The reflexion to the phantasm is the means intellect employs to apply an originally abstracted intelligible form to a thing held in the phantasm (cf. *De Pot.,* 3. 9 ad 22; *ST,* I. 84. 7; 16. 3), in vital concourse with the external senses, so that the *in-esse* of predicate in subject is an attainment of extra-mental *esse,* in that the very existence exercised by predicate in subject is relational. With this in mind one can see that although judgment belongs to intellect as intellect rather than to intellect as *ratio,* judgment nevertheless takes time because of the discursiveness of sense; all perfect judgments are resolved, not to the phantasm in isolation, but to the phantasm in union with all the other sense powers. This would be of importance in any detailed exposition of the aesthetic judgment in that it would explain how man can be in possession of an intuition, spiritual in character, which nevertheless is had within a temporal sequence; for example, the contemplation of much visual art and certainly of all poetry and music.

being aided, of course, by the *vis cogitativa.* In fact St. Thomas often affirms that if one would know anything he must represent it in a phantasm and "read" therein the intelligibility sought.[23] With this in mind, can we not say that the suprasensible and yet somewhat infrarational world of art—certainly a symbolic world—must be rooted in the phantasm? Since all aesthetic experience centers immediately on the supposit,[24] or on an accidental whole[25] united after the pattern of a supposit, would not this indicate how the symbolic as well as the individual existent, both of which are of the very tissue of poetic knowledge, can coalesce in one indivisible act in which a being, possibly charged with symbolic signification, is intuited in its very act of existing? A being charged with symbolic signification is an object-sign, whose *esse,* as a sign, is an *esse ad,* an intentional thrust into the transcendental intelligibility of being.

This location of the aesthetic judgment in the subject component of the second operation of the intellect "places" the peculiar activity of preparation and attentive passivity undergone by the artist prior to creation;[26] this location also circumscribes the realm of simple good taste, of discrimination, and of the *experimentum* of art. Since sophisticated phantasms are often the work of prior abstractions, reasonings, and judgments, would not this indicate how complex and highly articulated symbolism can function in an aesthetic judgment without abstraction being made from the symbolized in this particular given act? It would seem to suggest an explanation for the operation of memory in many aesthetic judgments. The meaning of some symbolism, possibly quite subtle, having been attached to

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[23]*CG,* II. 73; *ST,* I. 60. 4 ad 1; 84. 7; II-II. 180. 6 ad 2; *In Evangelium S. Joannis,* c. i, lect. 1. For insight into the phantasm, cf. B. Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies,* VII (1946), 372-79; and Robert J. Henle, S.J., *Method in Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 22-51.

[24]St. Thomas often states that the subject element in all judgment stands for the supposit (cf. *ST,* I. 13. 12). The intentional reiteration of the structure of finite being could not be more forcefully indicated. The supposit is that which has the act of being. " 'Quod est' dicit ipsum suppositum habens esse" (*In I Sent.,* d. 8. 2). The supposit is that which possesses (*ST,* III. 2. 1 and 17. 2; *Quodlibet.,* 2. 4) and this is analogously reflected in the judgment in which the predicate inheres in and belongs to the subject (which is the supposit intentionally) with an *inesse* which is an *esse-ad,* which is the very act of being true itself.

[25]For a discussion of this unification of an accidental whole in art see Walter Ong, S.J., "Imitation and the Object of Art," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XVII (1940), 66-69.

[26]We have in mind the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience as described by A. E. Housman, Joseph Conrad, and Flaubert, for example.

this complex subject in the past, man carries with him in his intuition a host of evocative but nonconceptualized associations which can be the very memory of the race[27] as well as matter for artistic application. The highly symbolic work of many contemporary poets and painters, for example, although often attacked for irrationality, does mean something; and what it means is the very luminosity of being, seen obscurely through the intentional instrumentality of the symbol.

An aesthetic grasp of existence and its values, whether it is symbolic as in art or nonsymbolic (at least directly) as in nature, is not a stumbling below rationality into some kind of mystification. It is rather a kind of knowing, in which the known is contemplated in the very act by which all that is, is.

It is because of this that in a very real sense the poetic experience must always be in opposition to the critical judgment. The poetic experience belongs to the order of exercise; the critical judgment, to the order of specification. Whereas the archetype of the aesthetic judgment is "This is beautiful," the archetype of the critical judgment must be "This is a beautiful something." Just as the third adjacent puts limit on the affirmation of *esse,* following, and dependent, upon the limit essence puts on *esse,* so too does the critical judgment define and delimit the beauty poetically grasped or expressed. As *esse* stands to *quod est,* so the aesthetic act stands to the critical act. The aesthetic act affirms that beauty *is;* the critical act judges *about* the beauty that is. The critical judgment, to be vital, must follow upon the aesthetic judgment, just as composition follows on the affirmation of existence.

In this unique act we have the grasp of some whole, of something possibly symbolic, seen in and through the phantasm in a vital intercourse with all the sensory powers of man. This whole is intuited in the very perfection of its own unique act of existing and is seen, at least if it is symbolic, as meaning being. This act is a function of the judgment. The whole, whether natural or artificial, is subject, while the intelligibility predicated of this whole is not the expression of formal limitation, but the predication of the transcendental beauty, which is the very perfection constituting the act of existing.

It might be objected that if the being intuited in this experience were simply the being affirmed in all judgments—and particularly in

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[27] "Song is the mistress of memory . . . an instrument for the resurrection of lost things" (Hilaire Belloc, "Song," *On Everything* [London: Methuen, 1909], p. 4).

the open affirmation of existence which is the second adjacent—there would be no way to differentiate the aesthetic act from the common existential judgments made every moment of the day. In reply to such an objection, it must be emphasized that in the grasp of the beautiful, being is not simply affirmed to be. No; this being is seen here and now in a unique way. It is seen as actually perfected by, and energized in, its own act of existing in such a manner that the will is quieted and the intellect acquiesces in it. It is good for me that this thing should exist. The will does not move toward possession, but is dominated by the intellect in its contemplation; in turn the will dominates the body, so that the entire being of man is engaged with confronting a concentration of its transcendental density which is beauty.

If "being concreted in a sensible quiddity" (after the vigorous formula of Cajetan) is not being as it is known in the aesthetic experience, nevertheless the problem remains of the relations between the being of the aesthetic act and the being of metaphysics. At the very outset it seems significant that the specification of the metaphysical *habitus* is normally preceded, as M. Maritain has so often taught, by an intuition, highly personal in character,[28] that is not at all unlike the poetic act we are concerned with. Both have in common what might be called a cutting through the average attitude toward being. This attitude takes being simply on the surface, as it were; it simply takes being for granted in its very existing and of interest generally only in its function.[29] Common sense, and particularly the common sense of modern man, when faced with being asks, "What can it do?" In this view things exist merely as tools; they do not, literally, exist in themselves. It could happen, though, that an insight, negatively aesthetic, into the profound nothingness, the ontological barrenness, of contemporary technological civilization might act as a preparation for the intuition of being as being. In any case, this unique metaphysical insight into being, whatever its source, is like the insight of the aesthetic experience.

In order to demonstrate this likeness it is necessary to briefly recall certain fundamental truths about the formal object of metaphysics. In the intellect there are two operations corresponding to two facets of being: the act of simple understanding, whose object is essence

[28]Cf. Maritain, *Court Traité de l'Existence et de l'Existant* (Paris: Hartman, 1947), pp. 37-42.

[29]Cf. the remarkable phenomenology of this problem in Gabriel Marcel, "On the Ontological Mystery," *The Philosophy of Existence* (London: Harvill Press, 1948), pp. 1-31.

or being inasmuch as it is potential; and the act of judgment, whose object is being in its act, "to be." Now, St. Thomas teaches that the specification of metaphysics is not had within the order of simple apprehension, because metaphysics is not specified by means of an abstraction properly so called. It is not specified either by means of that abstraction of a form from matter which is proper to mathematics or by means of that abstraction of a whole from its parts which is common to all the sciences. *Ens in quantum ens* and all those modes of being following being simply, which it is the privilege of the metaphysician to know, are disengaged by the intellect in a negative judgment, which St. Thomas calls a "separation."[30] Since this

[30]"Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet (scire), quo (modo) intellectus secundum suam operationem abstrahere possit. Sciendum est igitur quod secundum Philosophum in *III de Anima* duplex est operatio intellectus: una quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque quid est; alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enunciationem affirmativam vel negativam formando, et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus respondent. . . . Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei. . . . Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod conformatur (rei), patet quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere, quod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio(nem) secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab albedine dicendo 'homo non est albus', significo esse separationem in re. . . . Hac ergo operatione intellectus vere abstrahere non potest nisi ea quae sunt secundum rem separata, ut cum dicitur 'homo non est asinus'. . . . Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas operationes, quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima tantum. . . . Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur: una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie, et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae; alia secundum operationem, qua formantur quidditates rerum, quae est abstractio formae a materia sensibili, et haec competit mathematicae; tertia secundum eandem est communis omnibus scientiis. . . ." (Thomas von Aquin, *In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta*, Nach dem Autograph herausgegeben von Paul Wyser, O.P. [Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1948] pp. 38-40). The literature on the *separatio* is, of course, recent and not too extensive. See L. B. Geiger, O.P., *La Participation dans la Philosophie de s. Thomas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942), pp. 317-41, and "Abstraction et séparation d'après saint Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, XXXI (1947), 3-40; M. V. Leroy, O.P., "Abstractio et separatio d'après un texte controversé de s. Thomas," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), 328-39; Maritain, *Court Traité*, pp. 51-53; Jean-Hervé Nicolas, O.P., "Chronique de Philosophie," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), pp. 51-53; J. D. Robert, O.P., "La Metaphysique, science distincte de toute autre discipline philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), L (1947), 206-23.

separation is effected by means of a judgment, what is separated is not being in its limit (essence, *ens nominaliter sumptum*); what is separated is being in that act which is its exercise. *Esse,* principally, is what is separated; and it is separated from that thing which has *esse* and which denominates that thing a being (*ens*). Through this judgment the metaphysician sees that the act of existing is not of the essence of the thing that exercises that act. "To be" is not identified with "to be material" or "to be this or that." In this separation the act of being is intuited as an act transcending the material and formal conditions in which it is found and which it causes. This negative judgment is rendered possible by the real distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* (*esse*), between the thing that is and the act by which it is. The term of this separation is the concept of being, which is neither the concept of *some* being nor the "concept" of essence (which would be an *ens rationis,* the concept of determinateness expressed indeterminately) nor the "concept" of existence (*existentia ut significata,* another *ens rationis* in which what is not of the order of essence is treated as though it were).[31] But it is, so to speak, the concept of what is not an essence. "Being is taken from the act of 'to be' ";[32] "being is a having 'to be.' "[33] The concept of being, in short, points beyond itself to that act which renders

There is some difference of opinion among the above philosophers in their interpretations of the *separatio* texts. So far as this writer can see, the most radical reason why the metaphysical *habitus* cannot be specified by an abstraction, properly so called, is that *ens* is the dynamic "state" caused intrinsically by *esse.* Without *esse* there is no *ens.* Since *ens* derives its entire intelligibility from the act of existing, and since the act of being, as an act (*in actu exercito*), is grasped by man only in the judgment, the metaphysician's concept of being must be consequent on an intuition of being in the judgment. Whether this *separatio entis* is preceded by another intuition, personal in character (Maritain), or whether it follows on a reasoning process (Fr. Geiger), the point to be stressed is that it is a disengagement within the order of judgment. To the objection that being must first be apprehended before being judged, we answer that it is from common-sense being, from some concrete sensible thing, that the absolute value of *ens in quantum ens* is disengaged. Hence the metaphysician does not judge and separate in a void. He judges, let us say, "This thing is," and finally affirms that "to be" is not exhausted by, or to be identified with, the essences here and now affirmed to be. The separation terminates in the analogical concept of being, and quite naturally all matter and motion are left behind.

[31]Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, Cardinal, *Commentarium in Summa Theologiae,* I. 2. 1. n. viii.

[32]"Hoc nomen ens . . . imponitur ab ipso esse" (*In IV Metaph.,* lect. 2, n. 558 [ed. Cathala]; *De Ver.,* 1. 1).

[33]"Ens dicitur quasi esse habens" (*In XII Metaph.,* lect. 1, n. 2419 [ed. Cathala]).

all concepts possible and gives this unique notion its very intelligibility. Born of a judgment, the concept of being expresses the formal intelligibility of what is not a form, the very *ratio entis*.[34] The genesis of the concept of being analogously reiterates the structure of being itself. As a being (*ens*) blossoms from its being (*esse*), so the concept of being follows the conception of the act of existing in the judgment—a *verbum* issuing from a *verbum*.

Metaphysics knows all it knows in function of the act of being.[35] Nevertheless, this wisdom bears within itself the character of all human science, in that it reaches the necessary only by giving up the contingent. The metaphysician is engaged, true enough, with the very root necessity of all necessity—the necessity that whatever is must be while it is.[36] He is interested in the contingent existent, not as contingent but as existent. The transcendental properties of being can be seen by him in the fullness of their analogousness only by a separation from the matrix of material contingency.

Here we have the first analogical community of poetry and metaphysics, as well as the seed for their eventual parting of the ways. Both poetry and metaphysics bear on being through the instrumentality of the judgment; but the poet intuits the intelligibility of being as immersed in the things of matter which here and now confront him through the senses. There is no separation in the aesthetic judgment as such, because the will rejoices before the vision of that which is. The act of existing is not known through a conception in a judgment terminating in a concept of being. The act of existing is known as penetrating, energizing, perfecting this thing that is. Except in God, the act of being is not subsistent,[37] but is that by which something is. It is the very perfection proportioned to, and limited by, some essence that *is*, is *being* by and through that act. This vision of some "be-ing," seen and rejoiced in, in the very flowering of its perfection, is the object of the aesthetic experience.

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[34]"Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi" (*De Ver.*, 1. 1 ad 3).

[35]"But when the metaphysician thinks of being, he thinks primarily of the act by which all being is (*esse*) and only secondarily of the thing or the quiddity which exercises this act and which is, as it were, but the vehicle by which the knowledge of that act (*esse*) is transported to his mind and the staff or stay or prop which upholds it in conception," (Gerald B. Phelan, "A Note on the Formal Object of Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism*, XVIII [1944], 199).

[36]"Quia omne quod est, cum est, necesse est esse, ut dicitur" (*ST*, I. 14. 13 ad 2).

[37]Cf. *CG*, II. 54; *Commentarium in Boethii de Hebdomadibus.*

It is some being in exercised act living intentionally in exercised act; it is a mysterious communion in being carrying with it both obscurity and intelligibility.[38]

If common sense and the inferior sciences know being not as being, but as that which the act of being intrinsically causes to be, and if metaphysics knows being (*ens*) as being (*esse*), poetry knows being (*esse*) *in* being (*ens*).

In the aesthetic experience there can be no separation of being from matter and motion. But if artistic creation follows poetic contemplation, there then occurs a second poetic movement that analogously mimics the movement of first philosophy. As the metaphysician expresses the act of existing conceived in the judgment through the concept of being, so the poet conceives the fruit of his contemplation in a word which is a creation—a *verbum* which is a *factum*. This is a kind of separation; but since it is not a separation from matter, but a separation in matter, it is in the very line of art—a making. Being is minted in the coin of human personality.

If the analysis of the aesthetic experience and its object sketched in this essay is substantially true, then certain conclusions about the nature of the fine arts necessarily follow. The imitation of the analogical will be itself analogical. The work of art stands in relation to the intelligibility of being expressed through it as does the prior aesthetic judgment stand to the intelligibility of being contemplated. Both are related proportionately to the perfection of the being first intuited. The perfection of this being, in the last analysis, is the act of existing which is proportionate to the essence that receives, limits, and by that act is. The total process from intuition to expression includes at least a triple set of proportions related proportionately, in which the being first known aesthetically in the judgment stands as the prime analogate. Therefore the universal values of art can issue from the most intimate of experiences simply because the object of the experience, being, is not only totally "immanent" to the experience, but also "transcends" the experience.

Secondly, although that which is *meant* in art is being, that through which being in art is incarnated is form dominating matter. Because of this the symbolic instrumentality employed in the projection of beauty (as well as in its initial discovery in the judgment) could not be within the order of metaphysical analogy, since all artistic symbolism partakes of the common *ratio* of the material.

[38]Cf. Raissa Maritain, "Sens et Non-Sens en Poésie," *Situation de la Poésie* (avec J. Maritain) (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), pp. 13-47.

The symbolized is properly analogical, but the symbol can be analogical only in function of the analogy of inequality.[39] The symbol is but an instrumental sign, yet an instrumental sign forever longing to be a formal sign.

The history of art could be written as the struggle between symbolized and symbol, between the analogical and the univocal. On the one hand, the refusal to employ apt and disciplined means or the longing to do away with means altogether results in mystification or in a satanic urge to usurp the power to create *ex nihilo*.[40] On the other hand, the domination of the aesthetic means over the aesthetic end has usually resulted in either artistic rationalism or facile representationalism. A chapter in this history of art would deal with the scandalous estrangement of the artist and society in modern times. This cultural disaster would be explained, in no small measure, by the refusal of nineteenth-century Western man to comprehend the causal link between art and the analogy of being. The artist's work has not been understood because society has insisted upon viewing the material means as the very end of the work. When the poet writes of the "tears of God," he may be talking *about* tears, but he means God. The clowns of Rouault are not characters in a local circus; they are a human prefiguring of Christ on the cross.

One can imitate univocally the surface of things. One can even imitate univocally the material essences of things.[41] That is simply to state the metaphysical presuppositions of mass production. One can duplicate, let us say, exactly the same machine in an indefinite number of copies, so that it can be said that the essence of machine A exactly reiterates all the formal and material conditions of machine B. The selfsame essence can then be predicated of both beings.

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[39]"Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem: et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicuius communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis" (*In I Sent.*, d. 19. 5. 2 ad 1).

[40]The French symbolists sometimes manifested this urge to cause *to be* without the use of material means. Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus* clearly demonstrates the same tendency in the person of the composer Adrian Leverkühn.

[41]"Dicendum quod cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae communicant in eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum eundem modum; et haec non solum dicuntur similia, sed aequalia in sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur similia in albedine. . ." (*ST*, I. 4. 3).

Yet being cannot be predicated univocally of both beings. If it could, they would not differ in being. There would not be two or many machines, but there would *be one being.*[42] Since poetic knowledge and the art following this knowledge bear directly upon being in the fullness of its perfection, univocal or copy imitation is a philosophical impossibility.

Finally, if poetry, particularly modern poetry, seems to yearn for a lost kingdom, it may be that modern poetry has struck being in its very core. What Gerard Manley Hopkins found in his "inscape" was "the very act of existing . . . most intimate to each thing . . . and most fundamentally present within all things . . . formal in respect to everything in a thing."[43] If the aesthetic experience is an analogue to the mystical experience, may it not be because the poet, in touching what is deepest in being—and since God is where his proper effect is[44]—has touched the heart of the creature in the hand of the King?

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[42]"Si enim in Petro non differret homo et hominem esse, impossibile esset, quod homo univoce diceretur de Petro et Paulo, quibus est esse diversum" (*De Ver.*, 2. 2). "Diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis" (*De Pot.*, 7. 7). ". . . in re duo sit considerare: scilicet naturam vel quidditatem rei, et esse suum, oportet quod in omnibus univocis sit communitas secundum rationem naturae, et non secundum esse, quia unum esse non est nisi in una re; unde habitus humanitatis non est secundum idem esse in duobus hominibus; et ideo quandocumque forma significata per nomen est ipsum esse, non potest univoce convenire, propter quod etiam ens non univoce praedicatur" (*In I Sent.*, d. 35. 1. 4).

[43]"Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt" (*ST*, I. 8. 1).

[44]"Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ipsius ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur . . . quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt. . . . Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime" (*ST*, I. 8. 1). Cf. *In I. Sent.*, d. 37. 1. 1; *CG*, III. 67.

THE SECOND MODE OF NECESSARY OR PER SE PROPOSITIONS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

William M. Walton

For St. Thomas Aquinas, as for Aristotle, there are two ways in which a predicate may be attributed necessarily or per se to a subject. In the first way the predicate forms part of the essence or definition of the subject. In the second way it is the latter which is necessarily implied as proper subject in the notion of the predicate.

> There are two modes of perseity. In one way a proposition is called necessary [*per se*] whose predicate falls within the definition of the subject, as in this statement, 'man is an animal', because animal is part of the definition of man. Since, moreover, that which is in the definition of something is in some manner its cause, in those things which are necessary [*per se*] the predicates are said to be cause of the subject. In another way, a proposition is called necessary [*per se*] whose subject, on the other hand, is placed in the definition of the predicate; as when we say that a nose is snub or that a number is even. For a snub nose is nothing else than a curved nose, and an even number is nothing else than a number divisible by two. In these propositions the subject is cause of the predicate.[1]

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[1] *In II de Anima*, lect. 14 (ed. Pirotta, no. 401). Cf. *In I Post. An.*, lect. 35 (ed. Leonine, no. 4): "[Aristotle] sets forth two modes of necessary [*per se*] predication. For whatever predicates are present in their subjects in that-which-is [*quod quid est*] are predicated necessarily in the first mode; that is, when the predicates are placed in the definition of the subject. Whenever the subjects themselves are present in the predicates in that-which-is—that is, when the subjects are placed in the definition of the predicates—it is the second mode of per se predication."

On *per se*, cf. *In I Post. An.*, lect. 11 (ed. Leonine, no. 5): "Aristotle shows that per se and in virtue of its own essence [*secundum quod ipsum*

In the second mode of necessary or per se propositions, however, the subject is not included as an intrinsic part of the predicate's very constitutive intelligibility, but rather as the proper matter or subject in which the predicate is received. This is so because the notion of a property, that is, a distinctive or necessary (*per se*) characteristic, cannot be understood without that of the subject.

> We have the second mode of necessary [*per se*] predication when the preposition *per* designates the relationship of material causality, according as that to which something is attributed is the proper matter and subject of the attribute. For it is necessary that the proper subject be placed in the definition of an accident. Sometimes this happens indirectly [*in obliquo*], as when an accident is defined in the abstract; for example, when we say that snubnosedness is curvature of the nose. If an accident be defined in the concrete, however, it happens directly [*in recto*], as when we say that a snub nose is a curved nose. The reason for this is that since the being [*esse*] of an accident depends upon the subject, the definition of the accident signifying its being [*esse*] must contain the subject. Hence we have the second mode of necessary [*per se*] predication when the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate, which is a proper accident [*proprium accidens*] of the subject. . . . But those predicates which are neutrally present, that is, those that are not placed in the definition of their subjects and which do not contain the subject in their own definition, are accidents; that is, they are predicated accidentally [*per accidens*], as musical and white are predicated accidentally [*per accidens*] of animal.[2]

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est] are the same. For example, point is present [*inest*] in line in the first mode of perseity and straightness in the second: both are present in line in so far as it is line." Cf. also Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1947), p. 237: "It [*per se*] always means *in virtue of itself, in virtue of its own essence (per suam essentiam)*—whether the quality under consideration forms part of the essence of the thing or necessarily results from it as its principle (in which case *per se* is opposed to *per accidens*)."

[2]*In I Post. An.*, lect. 10 (ed. Leonine, nos. 4-5). Cf. *On Being and Essence*, chap. 6: "Since the distinctive characteristics [*propriae passiones*] are caused by the proper principles of the subject, we include the subject in their definition in place of the difference if we define them in the abstract, in which way they belong properly in a genus. For instance, we say that snubnosedness is curvature of the nose. But it would be the reverse if we defined them in the concrete. In that case, in their definition we should include the subject as their genus, defining them as we do composite substances in which the nature [*ratio*] of the genus is taken from the matter. For example, we say that a snub nose is a curved nose." See also *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 4 (ed. Cathala, nos. 1342-55).

Individual determinations belong to the domain of the contingent. Hence, accidental notions are the predicates of contingent (non-necessary) propositions. Such purely contingent characteristics as John *is sitting,* Peter *is walking,* are obviously separable and must be distinguished from those attributes which are termed inseparable or per se accidents.

> Accident is predicated in two ways. In one way it is predicated as a separable accident which can be present in a thing or absent from it, such as *to sit.* In another way it is predicated as an inseparable and necessary [*per se*] accident. This latter is the accident in whose definition the subject to which it is attributed is placed; for example, snub is a necessary [*per se*] accident of nose because nose is included in the definition of snub.[3]

In substances composed of matter and form, however, there are also certain characteristics that arise out of the constituent being of an individual, and these are inseparable in the sense that they have a permanent source or cause in their subject. Such characteristics are derived from the particular dispositions of matter which they presuppose. That is to say, they presuppose certain material conditions in virtue of which the individual possesses his particular nature. *This* or *that* material condition is not itself necessary. It is nonetheless impossible for a man to exist without possessing a particular *constitution*:

> since the proper matter of man is a mixed body with a certain make-up [*complexionatum*] and endowed with organs, it is absolutely necessary that a man should have in himself each of the elements, humors, and principal organs.[4]

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[3] *In I Phys.*, lect. 6 (ed. Leonine, no. 10).

[4] *Contra Gentiles*, II. 30. Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I. 115. 3 ad 4: "It happens at times that the matter in human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; and so it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female." Cf. *ibid.*, II-II. 164. 2: ". . . with regard to the body, to which pertains the distinction of sex" and *In IV Sent.*, 44. 1. 3. 3: "Just as considering the nature of an individual there must be diverse quantity in diverse men, so in considering the nature of an individual, there must be diverse sex in diverse individuals." See also *In X Metaphys.*, lect. 11 (ed. Cathala, nos. 2128 and 2134), and *On Being and Essence*, chap. 6.

Note, however, *On Spiritual Creatures*, 2 ad 15: "Matter without form, strictly speaking, cannot be a subject, seeing that subject is predicated properly of something that is actually being [*ens actu*]." Cf. *ibid.*, 3 ad 20: "Matter, when considered by itself [*nuda*], is related to all forms indifferently." Cf. *ibid.*, 3 ad 18: "When matter is already understood to be perfected according to the nature [*ratio*] of the genus 'body' it is possible to understand therein dimensions which are proper accidents [*propria accidentia*] of this genus." See also *ST*, I. 76. 6 ad 1.

It is for this precise reason that

> there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to man. One is according to the nature of the species, the other according to the nature of the individual. And since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter; furthermore, since the form of man is the rational soul, while the matter is the body; hence it is that that which belongs to man according to the rational soul is natural to him according to the constitutive intelligibility of his species, while that which is natural to him according to the particular make-up [*complexionem*] of his body is natural to him according to his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man because of his body, considered as part of his species, in a way is to be referred to the soul, insofar as this particular body is proportioned to this particular soul.[5]

It seems worth digressing here to recall that on the empiriological plane there have been various attempts at classifying *constitutional types* on the basis of a preponderance of one or another *constitutional factor*. The four classical temperaments (sanguine, choleric, melancholic, phlegmatic) were ascribed to an excess of one or another of the bodily *humors* (which were designated as blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm). Among contemporary psychiatrists there are those who lay considerable stress on what they call *constitutional predisposition* to psychic disturbance. For example, current psychiatric literature is replete with reference to cyclothymic temperament as characteristic of manic-depressive patients. So, too, through the insights of psychosomatic medicine, physicians are ever discovering "new" mind-matter or soul-body connections.[6]

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[5]*ST*, I-II. 63. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, I-II. 51. 1: "It is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective constitutions." Cf. *ibid.*, I-II. 81. 2: "Even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition are transmitted to the children, e.g., fleetness of foot, acuteness of mind, etc." Cf. *ibid.*, I-II. 81. 1: ". . . granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, because of a defect in a bodily disposition, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots." See also *On the Power of God*, 3. 9 ad 7; *CG*, II. 65, 2d last par., II. 63, last par.; and Jacques Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-12.

[6]See, for example, Gordon W. Allport, *Personality* (New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1937), pp. 63-64; D. B. Klein, *Mental Hygiene* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1944), pp. 208-9; Edward A. Strecker, "The Leaven of Psychosomatic Medicine," *Annals of Internal Medicine*, XVIII (1943), 736-40; George P. Klubertanz, S.J., "The Psychologists and the Nature of Man," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXV (1951), 86.

To return from our digression, we must note, then, that there are really

> three genera of accidents. Some are caused by the principles of the species, and are called *proper* accidents: for instance, the ability to laugh in man. Others are caused by the principles of the individual, and this refers to two groups. First, there are those that have a permanent cause in their subject: for example, masculine and feminine, and others of a similar nature. These are called *inseparable* accidents. Secondly, there are those that do not have a permanent cause in their subject, such as *to sit* and *to walk,* and these are called *separable* accidents. It is, moreover, a common characteristic of every accident that it does not constitute part of the essence of a thing, and thus it is not found in a thing's definition. Hence we understand *what something is* without knowing anything about its accidents.[7]

If, however, through simple apprehension we can grasp *what something is* apart from its distinctive characteristics, this is not so with respect to the other activity of mind; namely, judgment.

> The activity of the mind is twofold. . . . One whereby it understands what something is: and in such an operation of the mind the essence of a thing can be understood, both apart from a property and apart from an accident, since neither of these enters into the essence of the thing. . . . The other is the activity of the intellect combining and dividing; and in this act a substance can be understood apart from an accidental predicate, even if it is inseparable in reality [*secundum rem*]: thus *a crow is white* is intelligible; for there is no repugnance of objects of thought [*intellectuum*]here, since the opposite of the predicate does not depend upon the principles of the species which is designated by the term posited in the subject. By this activity of the mind, however, a substance cannot be understood without its property; for that *man has not the power of laughing* is not intelligible, nor that a *triangle does not have three angles equal to two right angles;* for here there is repugnance of objects of thought, since the opposite of the predicate depends upon the nature of the subject.[8]

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[7]*The Soul,* 12 ad 7. Cf. *In I Sent.,* 17. 1. 2 ad 2: "The subject is related to divers accidents in divers ways. Certain accidents are natural insofar as they emanate from the principles of the subject; and this in two ways: either they are caused by the principles of the species and then they are distinctive characteristics [*propriae passiones*] which follow from the entire species; or they are caused by the principles of the individual, and then they are common, following from natural individual principles."

[8]*On Spiritual Creatures,* 11 ad 7. Cf. *ibid.,* 3 ad 14: "If someone thinks man, not thinking his power of laughter, he is not in error; but he would

In a necessary proposition, the presence of the attribute signified by the predicate in the thing signified by the subject is grounded in the essence of the subject; and either the predicate is precontained in the definition of the subject (first mode), or the subject is precontained in the definition of the predicate (second mode). In a contingent proposition the presence of the attribute signified by the predicate in the thing signified by the subject is grounded in an accidental determination that it receives, and the predicate is not precontained in the notion of the subject.

We have seen that such *innate* characteristics as John's particular temperament are derived from the particular dispositions of matter which they presuppose. From the very fact that they are derived from matter, as the ground of individuation, they do not have a principle which requires them in virtue of its very constitutive intelligibility. For matter of itself has neither essence nor intelligibility. In itself it is wholly indeterminate. Hence of itself it does not require certain individual characteristics rather than others. Since those individual characteristics are in fact derived from the individual nature and their primary root is the individual matter with the dispositions it happens to possess at the instant the subject comes into existence, they are necessary in a totally different sense from specific properties. Since they are required solely in virtue of the accidental dispositions matter happens to possess at a particular moment, let us say that they are necessary only *in fact* (*de facto*), as derivative from those particular dispositions. Such characteristics can be modified to a certain extent. They neither help to constitute the specific essence nor are they necessarily derived from it.

On the other hand, properties are necessarily derivative from the essence or a principle constitutive of the essence which requires them in virtue of its very concept. Let us say that they are necessary *by right* (*de jure*). It is well to note here that the *predicables* represent different modes of predicating and not different modes of existing. They are the modes of *being a predicate,* not the modes of *being.* They are *entia rationis,* creatures of logic, which studies the relations and interconnections which things have *as known;* that is, *as they exist in the mind.* If the logical is not the real, it is based

be if he thought man is not capable of laughter." Cf. *The Soul,* 12 ad 7: "But the species cannot be understood without the accidents which result from a principle of the species. It can, however, be understood without the accidents of the individual, even the inseparable accidents. But there can be not only a species without the separable accidents, but also an individual." See also *In I Sent.,* 26, *expositio textus.*

upon it, however. These intelligible necessities which we consider separately in abstract and universal natures do indeed exist in things and rule them in what pertains to their specific essence.

> A property is like a substantial predicate, inasmuch as it is caused by the essential principles of the species; consequently a property is demonstrated as belonging to a subject through the definition that signifies the essence.[9]

There is, therefore, a necessary intelligible connection between the essence of the species and the distinctive characteristics or properties which have their *raison d'etre* in that essence.

> We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms . . . as when the subject belongs to the notion [*de ratione*] of the predicate: thus it is necessary that a number be either odd or even.[10]

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[9]*On Spiritual Creatures*, 11. Cf. *On Being and Essence*, chap. 6: "But accidents which are consequent upon form are proper characteristics [*propriae passiones*] of the genus or species. Hence they are found in everything participating in the nature of the genus or of the species." Cf. G. H. Joyce, S.J., *Principles of Logic* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916), p. 127: "Besides the specific properties, there will be others, which result from the generic notes of the nature. These will, of course, not be limited to the species, but will be coextensive with the genus to which they belong." See also *On the Power of God*, 10. 4 ad 7; Thomas Gilby, O.P., *Barbara Celarent* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1949), pp. 148-49; and P. Coffey, *The Science of Logic* (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1912), I, 82-83.

[10]*ST*, I. 19. 3. Cf. *CG*, II. 30: "Thirdly, there is absolute necessity in things through the relations of their essential principles to the properties consequent upon their matter or form: thus it is necessary that a saw be hard, since it is of iron, and that a man be capable of learning." Cf. *ST*, I. 77. 6 ad 3: "The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance—just as one thing results naturally from another, as color from light."

Concerning this last example let us recall that in St. Thomas's day there were two opinions about the effect of light. He tells us that "some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. . . . But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight, not for the colors to become actually visible, but in order that the medium may become luminous" (*ST*, I. 79. 3 ad 2). In *The Soul*, 4 ad 4, he reports the view of Aristotle; namely, that color is visible per se: "Some said that light is necessary for sight inasmuch as it gives to colors the power of moving the sense of sight, as if color were not visible in virtue of itself [*ex seipso*], but only through light. But Aristotle seems to discard this theory when he says, in the *De Anima*, that color is visible per se, and this would not be the case if it were made visible only by light." Furthermore, St. Thomas points out that, according to this theory, "color is visible per se in the second, not in the first mode of perseity. For visibility is a certain characteristic [*passio*], as snub is a characteristic of nose. And this is what Aristotle says, namely, that color is visible in virtue of itself [*secundum se*] but not by definition [*ratione*]; that is to say, not in such

To take another example, "the powers of the soul can be called essential properties, not because they are parts of the essence, but because they are caused by the essence."[11] Furthermore, it is a universal principle that

> whatever belongs to anything in virtue of itself [*per se consequitur ad aliquid*] cannot be taken away from it. For example, you cannot take away from man that he be an animal, nor can you take from number that it be even or odd.[12]

As an example of this principle, St. Thomas holds that "since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them."[13] In the first operation of the mind, namely, simple apprehension, the essence of the soul can be understood apart from its powers. This is not so in the second operation of the mind, however. That the soul *be* without its powers is neither possible nor intelligible.[14]

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a way that visible is placed in its definition, but because it possesses in itself the reason why it should be visible, as a subject possesses in itself the reason for its distinctive characteristic [*propriae passionis*]" (*In II de Anima*, lect. 14 [ed. Pirotta, no. 402]).

See also *ST*, I-II. 8. 3 ad 2; *Compend. Theol.*, 83; and George P. Klubertanz, S.J., "A Note on the Thomistic Theory of Sensation," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVI (May, 1949), 485, n. 32.

[11]*On Spiritual Creatures*, 11 ad 5. Cf. *ibid.*, 11: "The powers of the soul are intermediate between the essence of the soul and an accident, as natural or essential properties, that is, as though [*quasi*] properties that are naturally derivative from the essence of the soul." Cf. *The Soul*, 19: "The powers of the soul do not belong to the essence of the soul, but are natural properties which flow from its essence." Cf. *ibid.*, ad 5: "In another way we predicate sense of the sensitive power itself, which, since it is a natural property, as has been pointed out, is not a constitutive part of the species but derivative from the species." Cf. *ST*, I. 77. 1 ad 5: "For property does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; whence it is a medium between essence and accident thus understood. In this way the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as though [*quasi*] natural properties of the soul." Cf. *ibid.*, I-II. 110. 4 ad 3: ". . . since the powers are natural properties of the soul following from the species. . ."

[12]*The Soul*, 14.

[13]*ST*, I-II. 110. 4 ad 4. Cf. *ibid.*, I. 77. 7 ad 1: "As a power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul. . ."

[14]"So then, in the first operation of the intellect the essence of the soul can be understood in such a way that its essence is understood apart from its powers; but not in the second operation—that is, so that it is understood not to have powers" (*On Spiritual Creatures*, 11 ad 7). "Therefore, although *what* the soul is can be understood without them, yet that the soul be without them is neither possible nor intelligible" (*The Soul*, 12 ad 7).

Specific properties are found wherever the specific essence is present; they are found nowhere else, and they are constant. The extension of the specific property is therefore the same as the extension of the species.

> A 'property' [according to Aristotle] is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property of man to be capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man.[15]

We have the second mode of necessary (*per se*) propositions whenever the analysis of the terms reveals the predicate to be a *property* which necessarily follows from the essence of the subject. Hence the connection between subject and predicate is absolutely inevitable and immutable. The proposition is intrinsically necessary. That is, it is necessary solely in virtue of the exigencies of the object. One of the terms is inevitably included in the other.[16]

True, the intelligible structures of the subject and predicate cannot be understood unless the mind possesses the intelligibles which it must abstract from sensible data. So, too, the analysis of the concepts can never arrive at the judgment *that things exist* unless the objects of those concepts are already known to be in existence. This knowledge in turn requires a union of the mind with the outside world through the senses. The connection between subject and predicate, however, is not *formally* derived from experience; that is to say, its *raison d'etre* is not a mere empirical verification (even

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[15]*Topics*, i. 5, 102a17-22 (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon [New York: Random House, 1941], p. 191). Cf. *ST*, II-II. 9. 2: "Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and another special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in logic. For in the genus of convertibles that which signifies *what a thing is* [*quod quid est*], is given the special name *definition* but the existent convertibles which fall short of this retain the common name and are called *properties*." See also *In III Sent.*, 35. 2. 3. 1.

[16]This is so whether the proposition in question is necessary [*per se*] in the first or second mode. Cf. *In III Sent.*, 11. 4 ad 6: "But that a proposition be necessary [*per se*] the predicate must belong to the subject in virtue of a form implied by the subject [*ratione formae importatae per subjectum*]. Cf. *ibid.*, 12. 1. 1 ad 6: "The predicate does not have to belong to the subject in virtue of an implied or distinctive form [*ratione formae significatae vel appositae*] except in the case of necessary predication." Cf. *On the Power of God*, 10. 4: "Whatever is present in a thing necessarily [*per se*] is either part of its essence [*de essentia eius*] or results from its essential principles." See also *ibid.*, 8. 2 ad 6.

though repeated many times), as in the case of propositions of the experimental order. It is derived from experience only *materially,* in that sensible experience is necessary to provide the materials for the abstractive operation of the mind, whose act of combining presupposes the required notions. This much admitted, it is because of the inner exigencies of the concepts themselves that they are seen to be necessarily connected. That is to say, we ascertain that necessary connection through a simple inspection (momentary or prolonged) of the terms.[17] Unlike propositions of the experimental order, the real identity on which the synthesis of subject and predicate is based is always required by the very notions themselves. Since the predicate is a distinctive attribute following inevitably from the essence of the subject, the latter must be contained in the definition of the former.

> It is the second mode when something is shown to be in something as in a first subject since it is necessarily inherent in it. Indeed this may happen in two ways. In one way the first subject of an accident is the whole subject of which the accident is predicated. For instance, a surface is said to be colored or white in virtue of itself. For the first subject of color is a surface, consequently a body is said to be colored in virtue [*ratione*] of its surface. In the other way some part of the subject is the first subject of the accident. For example, man is said to be living in virtue of himself, because some part of him, namely the soul, is the first subject of life.[18] And this is the second mode of necessary predication set forth in the *Posterior Analytics,* when, namely, the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate. For the first and proper subject is placed in the definition of a proper accident.[19]

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[17]Cf. Jacques Maritain. *A Preface to Metaphysics* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948), pp. 103-5, and Robert J. Henle, S.J., *Method in Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1951), p. 45 especially.

[18]Cf. also *ST*, I. 18. 2: "Hence living is not an accidental, but a substantial predicate." Cf. *ibid.*, III. 50. 5: ". . . since life is something that belongs to the essence of a living body; for it is an essential, and not an accidental predicate."

[19]*In V Metaphys.*, lect. 19 (ed. Cathala, no. 1055). Cf. *In I Post. An.*, lect. 10 (ed. Leonine, no. 8): "Consequently Aristotle shows that knowable things of this kind are necessary: since a proper accident must be predicated of a subject. This, however, may happen in two ways: either simply, as when one accident is convertible with the subject, such as *to have three*, and so on, is with *triangle*, and as the ability to laugh is with man; or in the sense that one or other of two opposities is present necessarily, such as straight or curved in reference to line, odd or even in reference to number." (For Aristotle, cf. *Basic Works*, p. 116.) *Cf. also CG*, II. 58: "Consequently if this order makes the aforesaid predications to be

Elsewhere, St. Thomas explains in greater detail the perseity of the connection between surface and color.

> However, it happens that a necessary [*per se*] predication is made through different forms when they are related to one another, as when it is said that a thing having a surface is colored. For color is in a substance by the means of its surface. Now this mode of necessary [*per se*] predication occurs not because the predicate is placed in the definition of the subject, but rather conversely. For surface is placed in the definition of color just as number is placed in the definition of even.[20]

Perhaps the natural philosopher or the metaphysician might object that "one [predicamental] accident cannot of itself [*per se*] be the subject of another since it does not exist of itself [*per se*]." St. Thomas explains, however, that

> insofar as accident is in another [*in alio*], one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through the other as intermediary, as a surface is said to be the subject of color.[21]

Propositions of the second mode of necessary (*per se*) predication obviously imply genuine notional passage from subject to predicate, since the predicate is not included in the definition of the subject. A distinctive characteristic (*proprium*) is "neither the essence of a thing, nor a part of the essence, but something over and above the

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necessary, this will not be in virtue of that mode of necessary predication which refers to form, but in virtue of that mode which refers to matter and subject, as a surface is said to be colored. But this is impossible. Because in this mode of necessary predication, that which is formal is predicated necessarily of the subject, as when we say: the surface is white, or the number is even. Again in this mode of necessary predication the subject is included in the definition of the predicate, as number in the definition of even."

[20] *The Soul*, 11. Cf. *ST*, I. 76. 3: "Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another . . . necessarily [*per se*], in the second mode of necessary [*per se*] predication, if the forms are ordered one to the other, because the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate. Thus a surface is presupposed for color, so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second mode of necessary [*per se*] predication."

[21] *ST*, III. 77. 2 ad 1. Cf. *ibid.*, I. 77. 7 ad 2: "An accident cannot of itself [*per se*] be the subject of an accident: but one accident is received in a substance prior to another, as quantity to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another (as surface is of color) inasmuch as a substance receives one accident through the means of another." See *ST*, I-II. 7. 1 ad 2 and 56. 1 ad 3; *The Soul*, 13 ad 8; *On Being and Essence*, chap. 6; *De Virtut. in Com.*, 3; *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 7 (ed. Cathala, no. 635).

essence itself."[22] It "falls short" of the most perfect of the "convertibles"; namely, the definition. Proper accidents follow from their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection.[23] This means that there is receptivity on the part of the subject in regard to necessary (*per se*) accidents.

> The subject, inasmuch as it is in potency, is receptive of the accidental form; but inasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and necessary [*per se*] accident.[24]

Because of this, when St. Thomas excludes from God the composition of accident with subject, he also denies any receptivity as regards even necessary (*per se*) accidents.

> Neither can there be any necessary [*per se*] accidents in Him, as the ability to laugh is a necessary [*per se*] accident of man, because accidents of this kind are caused by the principles of the subject.[25]

Since the subject is compared to a proper accident as cause to

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[22]*On Spiritual Creatures*, 11. Cf. *De Ver.*, 21. 1 ad 10: "Although convertible with man, the ability to laugh adds to man some extraneous nature [*addit aliquam naturam extraneam super hominem*], which is over and above the essence of man; but in this way nothing can be added to being." See also Jacques Maritain, *Réflexions sur l'intelligence* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924), pp. 70-72.

[23]Cf. *ST*, I-II. 83. 2 ad 3: "The essence of the soul is related to its powers as a subject to its proper accidents, which are subsequent to their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection." Cf. *ibid.*, 110. 4: "It remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul." Cf. *ibid.*, 4 ad 4: "Granted that it were without its powers, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational according to its species; not that it would actually have these powers, but because of the species of such an essence, from which these powers naturally flow."

[24]*Ibid.*, I. 77. 6. Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2: "The subject is both the final cause, and in some way [*quodammodo*] the active cause of its proper accident, and also the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. Cf. *ibid.*, 7: ". . . The receptive principle, as such, is less perfect."

[25]*ST*, I. 3. 6. Cf. *ibid.*, 4: "Whatever is present in something besides its essence must be caused, either by the principles of its essence—like a proper accident that is consequent upon the species, as the faculty of laughing is proper to man and is caused by the essential principles of the species. . ." Cf. *CG*, I. 32: "Nothing is predicated of God either as an accident or as a property; for a property belongs to the genus of [predicamental] accidents." See also *In I Sent.*, 8. 1. 1 ad 1.

Note that when we are thinking of predicamental accident—that is, of the contrast between substance and accident—we may say that the attribute "capable of laughter," or even the intellect (as power of the soul) in virtue of which man is capable of laughter, is an accident. See *ST*, I. 77. 1 ad 5 and *On Spiritual Creatures*, 11, and 11 ad 5.

effect,[26] it is a grave error to mistake such a consequent for a constituent. The identification of pleasure and happiness is a case in point. Pleasure or delight flows from, but does not constitute, happiness.

> In every thing that which belongs to its essence is distinct from its proper accident [*proprium accidens*]: as in the case of man, that he is a mortal rational animal is one thing [*aliud*] and that he is capable of laughter is another [*aliud*]. We must therefore consider that every delight is a certain proper accident following from happiness, or some part of happiness.[27]

In other words, "two things are required for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, which is, as it were [*quasi*], its necessary [*per se*] accident, namely, the delight connected with it."[28]

The immortality of the soul is predicated necessarily in the second mode of perseity, "because non-cessation of being is the natural property of what is spirtual in us,"[29] and all such properties are predicated in the second mode of perseity.

Since the very comprehension of the concept "rational soul" comprises all the notes that are attributed to its essence necessarily (*per se*), it also includes those which are contained virtually as well as those which are contained actually. In other words, it contains (although secondarily) those properties that are necessarily derived from its essence and fundamentally contained in its constitutive notes. "The form of man is the rational soul which is, of itself [*de se*], immortal."[30]

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[26]Cf. *De Virtut. in Com.*, 3: "The subject is compared to an accident in three ways. . . . The third way is as cause to effect; for the principles of the subject are the principles of a necessary [*per se*] accident."

[27]*ST*, I-II. 2. 6. Cf. *ibid.*: "Therefore it is evident that neither is delight itself, which follows from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting from it as a necessary [*per se*] accident."

[28]*ST*, I-II. 3. 4.

[29]Jacques Maritain, "The Immortality of Man," *The Review of Politics*, III (1941), 420. Cf. *ST*, I-II. 94. 1 ad 1: "Natural properties of the soul are inherent in it [*insunt ei*], such as immortality and the like."

[30]*ST*, II-II. 164. 1 ad 1. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p. 163: "In Thomas Aquinas' philosophy, the immortality of the human soul is an immediate evidence." On comprehension, see Jacques Maritain, *Formal Logic* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1946), pp. 21-26.

It is not in an ontological sense, however, but rather in a logical sense that the second mode of perseity is said to refer to material causality—insofar as the subject is the proper matter or subject of the predicate. This is so with regard to incorruptibility. "Incorruptible," which logically is predicated in virtue of subjective or material causality (in the order of second intentions), is an essential predicate which follows from the essence of human or spiritual soul as formal principle (ontologically). "Corruptible and incorruptible are essential predicates because they follow from the essence as a formal or material principle."[31]

In this, as in the other instances of the second mode of predicating per se, it is the subject which belongs to the notion or definition of the predicate, but precisely as subject and as possessing in itself the *raison d'etre* of the distinctive characteristic or property signified by the predicate.

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[31]*The Soul*, 14 ad 5. It is the same with corruptible in regard to any material essence, but in this case the essence is material principle in the ontological order.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Postcripts and Addenda to De Principiis Naturae

John J. Pauson

Some recent reviews[1] of the Fribourg text of St. Thomas's *De Principiis Naturae*[2] have brought to light a number of problems and questions concerning critical texts in general and concerning the validity of this critical text in particular. Certain clarifications, therefore, seem to be in order as to the editor's meaning of a "critical text," his purpose and intention in editing the *De Principiis*, and finally the justification of his manuscript survey and genealogy.

WHAT IS A CRITICAL TEXT?

The primary and fundamental aim of all critical texts must be to restore as closely as possible both the *sense* and the *words* of the original, whether that original might have been an autograph or the compilations of one or more auditors. The work of the editor of a critical text is not unlike the work of an archaeologist restoring a Grecian urn from disintegrated fragments left by the devastations of history. His purpose is not to produce a new work, but to reproduce an old one. Likewise, innovations and corrections have no place in a specifically critical text. Admittedly, the record of the diffusion of a particular work or tradition is a legitimate field of endeavor for a scholar; but it must also be recognized that its aim is other than that of a strict critical text. Similarly, comparisons made of a given critical text with a traditional or current text of the same work may have much practical value, but must be considered helpful adjuncts rather than essentials of a critical text.

In a case where the original is nonexistent, or where an existent original is susceptible of different interpretations, the resultant text

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[1]See, for example, P. O'Reilly's review in the *Bulletin Thomiste*, VIII (1951), 143-51, and that of J. P. Müller, O.S.B., in *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg), XXIX (June, 1951), 248-51.

[2]This text of mine was published two years ago (*Saint Thomas Aquinas* De Principiis Naturae: *Introduction and Critical Text* ["Textus Philosophici Friburgenses," 2; Fribourg: Société Philosophique; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1950]). It was reviewed by Vernon J. Bourke in The Modern Schoolman, XXVIII (Jan., 1951), 153-54.

can be said to be only *relatively critical,* in the sense that the certitude of its identity with the true original is always relative. Into this category must fall over ninty-nine per cent of all the texts edited. A *definitive* critical text, such as the Leonine editors have been commissioned to publish, is envisioned as a critical text that has made use of all the sources humanly possible to obtain within a reasonable length of time. Hence, unless all the European and American collections of manuscripts have been duly searched, it is difficult to see how any absolutely definitive critical text can be made. Even after such an exhaustive search, there always remains the outside possibility that the original or a very closely related manuscript might be unearthed in the remains of some medieval library. Should we on this account despair about all critical texts? Certainly we do not consider the Bekker edition of Aristotle in vain because of the discovery of the Vienna manuscript (phil. gr. C) used by Ross in his subsequent edition of the *Metaphysics.*[3] If we are to have any texts at all, we must be satisfied with making use of the presently available evidence. Of course, we must still realize that these texts are not absolutely perfect and that they are subject to future change upon the discovery of further evidence. In this regard, a very interesting and profitable study could be made of the autograph of part of St. Thomas's *In Librum Boethii de Trinitate*[4] in comparison with all the other known texts containing this work.

The remarkable progress of the science of photography brings the recorded treasures of the great libraries of the world within the reach of the ordinary scholar. Painstaking searches of the available manuscript catalogues reveal by far the majority of the extant manuscripts. We have a good basis for comparison of what the ordinary manuscript catalogues reveal with what a lifetime personal search can bring to light in the monumental work of Father G. Lacombe and others on *Aristoteles Latinus.*[5] Although as yet there is no corresponding *Aquinas Latinus,* the works of Thomistic scholars such as Grabmann, Mandonnet, Beltràn de Heredia, Pelster, and others have gone a long way towards its establishment.

The editor of a critical text, after he has by one means or another

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[3]W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics, *a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), I, clv.

[4]P. Wyser, O.P., *Thomas von Aquin* In Librum Boethii De Trinitate, *nach dem Autograph Cod. Vat. lat. 9850* (Fribourg: Société Philosophique; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948).

[5]G. Lacombe and others, *Aristoteles Latinus,* Pars Prior (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1939).

gathered photographs of all the available manuscripts containing his particular text, either finds them few enough to include the variations of all of them in his critical apparatus or is forced by their large number to adopt some principle of selection. Precisely on the principle of selection the Fribourg text of the *De Principiis Naturae* has been criticised. That some principle of selection was necessary is obvious from the fact of approximately sixty available texts. But before entering upon the question of the evidence for this editor's actual selection, there are a few questions about the principle of selection itself to be considered.

It is common experience that fifteenth- and late fourteenth-century texts, when found in sufficient numbers, defy complete and exact genealogical delineation. Various conjectures can be assigned to explain this phenomenon, among which the use of more than one example manuscript by the scribe—plus excessive liberty in changing style and content—is highly important. During this period of literary history we see an attempt, characteristic of the Central European Renaissance, to reform all Latin texts according to the Ciceronian norm. A very significant example of Renaissance editing of content has been brought to light by Rossi in his work on St. Thomas's *Expositio Salutationis Angelicae.*[6]

Certainly a general rule can be formulated that the older the manuscript is the more trustworthy it will prove to be. But obviously this, as every other rule, has exceptions; and there is a very important possible exception always facing the conscientious editor. One of the later texts may have been copied immediately from the original or some other highly important but unknown text. Consequently, these possibilities must be reasonably excluded before a text based entirely upon the earlier manuscripts can be justified. It is important, however, in a manuscript survey of this kind to keep in mind the end and purpose of the search, which is not to discover the exact history of the diffusion of the text, but to bring out the important and key manuscripts. Hence, it is sufficient evidence to reject a later manuscript if it can be seen to have no immediate link with some important source. Of course, herein lies the art of editing. Herein also lies the basis of controversy and the field for future discovery.

CLAIMS MADE FOR THE FRIBOURG TEXT

In seeking to justify the selection of manuscripts in the Fribourg text of the *De Principiis*, it seems necessary first to restate the editor's

[6] J. F. Rossi, C.M., "S. Thomae *Expositio Salutationis Angelicae*," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), XXXIV (1931), 453.

claims in order to limit the expected scope of this justification. It cannot be denied that the text was intended by the editor to be a critical text, but "critical" in the sense indicated in the first part of this article. The text is the editor's reconstruction of the original based upon the then available evidence. Despite a possible misinterpretation of part of the editor's preface, the text was neither intended nor claimed to be definitive. Since the Leonine Commission did not foresee the immediate publication of the opuscula, Father Suermondt, the president of the Commission, agreed that a text of the *De Principiis* should be prepared utilizing the currently available evidence. In the preface there is an expression of hope that some of the facts uncovered for this work might prove helpful in clearing the path for the future definitive edition of all of the opuscula, including the *De Principiis*. However, in no sense can it be concluded that the genealogy and related facts pertaining to the *De Principiis* were claimed to hold for the rest of the individual works contained in the more important opuscula collections. Furthermore, until it can be proved, the assumption that the history of the major opuscula codices must determine the standing of the individual works contained in them appears gratuitous in the extreme. Actually, of the six manuscripts chosen as the basis of the text of the *De Principiis*, three were taken from opuscula collections and three were not.

Attention also must be called to two qualifying statements apparently overlooked by the critics which limit the scope and claims of the genealogical graph. The first is that the genealogy of the later manuscripts and incunabula are to be considered as *approximate* and *incomplete* (p. 19), and the second is that the basis of the family groupings described is *general similarity* of reading and *presumed* sharing of some known or unknown thirteenth-century source (p. 19). Although these statements obviously weaken the claim of the genealogical graph to accuracy, they are perfectly consistent with the purpose of the whole genealogical consideration, which was to bring to light the manuscripts most representative of the initial diffusion of the archetype (p. 19).

As at least an implicit claim, Father O'Reilly[7] calls into question the editor's assertion that the archetype of the *De Principiis Naturae* was written down by St. Thomas himself. There is certainly no proof that there was an autograph of the *De Principiis*, but there are some very interesting speculations. If we accept the date of composi-

[7] *Op. cit.*, 149.

tion as between 1252 and 1254 (p. 70), it would have been written at a time when St. Thomas's pre-eminence was by no means at its height; and the probability is that there would be less interest in preserving his words in writing. On the other hand, there is little proof that he was not immediately accepted by his confreres as an authority. Secondly, there is no evidence that any of the variations of the early manuscripts can be attributed directly to the difficulties inherent in vocal transmission. Again the evidence is negative and weak. A third consideration is the dedication, "Ad Fratrem Sylvestrum," the authenticity of which cannot be said to be above suspicion (p. 66). Would the probability be that Brother Thomas dictated the treatise to one of his confreres or that he scribbled it down and presented it to him afterwards? The latter supposition would be very consistent with the evidence of diversity in the early copies, since, as we know from what examples are preserved, St. Thomas's handwriting was quite difficult to read. At best, all of the above considerations are highly conjectural, and the editor stands corrected by Father O'Reilly on this point.

The main point at issue, however, is the justification of the genealogy within the limits set down. Is the genealogy sufficiently accurate to bring to light the important type manuscripts? This will be answered, not without introducing evidence previously omitted, first in a consideration of the variations of all the available texts for a few short sections, secondly in a special consideration of the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century manuscripts, and finally in a consideration of the fifteenth- and later fourteenth-century texts.

[*To be continued*]

CHRONICLE

An Institute on Contemporary Problems in Thomism is being offered during the summer session at Saint Louis University. It is intended for teachers, Newman Club chaplains, graduate students, and other qualified persons who are interested in contemporary problems. It will be given in two self-contained units of three weeks each (June 17—July 3, July 7—25). Each unit consists of these lecture-discussion series, together with special lectures and discussions.

The first unit will consider Thomistic philosophy and contemporary problems in the theory of knowledge, natural theology, and the

philosophy of man; the second, further problems in the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of nature, and ethics. Further information may be obtained from the dean of the Graduate School of the University.

Professor Etienne Gilson gave a talk, "Dogmatism and Democracy," at the Saint Louis University auditorium. Sponsored by the Graduate School and the Philosophers' Club of the University, the address was enthusiastically received.

The Catholic University of America will conduct a series of workshops from June 13 through June 24. One of these workshops is "on theology, philosophy and history, as integrating disciplines in the college of liberal arts." The director of this workshop will be Dr. Roy J. Deferrari, who is also general director of all the workshops and of the summer session.

The Metaphysical Society of America held its third annual meeting on March 22 at Yale University, in connection with Yale University's two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary celebration. The program consisted of six papers: "The Hierarchy of Essences," by Mortimer J. Adler; "Action," by John Wild; "The Past: Its Nature and Reality," the presidential address, by Paul Weiss; "Creativity and the Other," by Isabel Stearns; "The Philosophy of Formal Systems," by Haskell B. Curry; and "Ontological Categories for Language," by Arthur Burks.

The Institute for the Unity of Science of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has announced its second essay prize-contest. The theme is "Mathematical Logic as a Tool of Analysis: Its Uses and Achievements in the Sciences and Philosophy." The essays are not to exceed 25,000 words and must be submitted before January 1, 1953. The first prize is $500; there are two other prizes of $200 each. The contest is open to anyone from any country; only essays written in English, French, or German will be accepted. Further particulars can be obtained from the Institute.

The Sixth Congress of Les Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française will be held at Strasbourg, September 10-14, 1952. The theme of the congress will be "man and history."

The Millenary Anniversary of the Birth of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) occurs this year. The Arab League sponsored some publications and a congress held at Baghdad in March, 1952. The government of Iran sponsored the publication of the Persian texts of Avicenna and a congress held at Teheran.

BOOK REVIEWS

ETHICS. A TEXTBOOK IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By Vernon J. Bourke. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. xii + 497. $4.25.

Reviewers who read enough reviews should be wary of announcing epochal changes and startling new talents. The number of epochal changes and startling new talents recorded in the slicker and more professional general book reviews leaves one a little dizzy. And we are no longer startled by the talented philosophical competence of the authors of this and the other opening volume[1] of the "Christian Wisdom Series." We are accustomed to it. And whether the appearance of these two volumes in a very promising series is epochal I am not sufficiently a spectator of all time and all existence to know. But it is a heartening mark of maturity in American Catholic philosophical scholarship. They are quite competent books. To teacher and student alike they are very useful books. And the publisher has happily given them easy legibility and attractive format.

With respect to the volume under examination it is only fair both to the reader and the author to say that this reviewer was able to use the published version of this book with students in the past summer. Since no one actually teaching ethics or interested in the teaching of it will want to be without a copy, at least for comparative purposes, it seems better to discuss the actual use of this book with students, and its philosophic content.

The philosophic content throughout is derived from the moral teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. This is not, however, the rubber-stamp kind of derivation with which we are sadly too familiar. Moral problems change not by the century but by the day. But—some Catholic textbooks in ethics seem unaware of this—the moral life does not. And the solid principles of Christian morality have not changed. St. Thomas presented them rather well. Dr. Bourke makes it possible for the student to integrate the solid Christian

[1]Gerard Smith, S.J., *Natural Theology. Metaphysics II.* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951). (See THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXIX [January, 1952], 180.)

principles of St. Thomas's moral teaching into his own moral life.

To write an ethics textbook that can and will actually bear on the moral life of our students an author must do two things. He must explicitly relate and distinguish moral theology and moral philosophy. And he must be explicitly honest about the natural and supernatural in relation to the end of man. Wisely, indeed, the author does not claim to be giving the students the last word on these thorny points (chaps. i and ii). Equally wisely he presents more views than one on these points. But most wisely of all—to the joy of the teacher's heart—he presents them so clearly and well that any teacher can make them perfectly clear who wants to be equally honest about them.

In fact Dr. Bourke has at last, in his first two chapters, found a way out of his embarrassment for the man who first said (and all his fellow sufferers): "I can't say much about the end of man! But I'm a bearcat on the human act."

It is in the analysis of the moral act that St. Thomas gave us some of his very best guidance, and in his analysis the author has given us some of his finest work. The detail and precision may seem forbidding here, especially in contrast with some inadequate analyses, but they are helpful and useful to students by reason of their very thoroughness. When the fundamentals of the moral act and reason as the standard of morality (chaps. iii and iv) are mastered (the diagrams on pages 64 and 129 do a great deal of the teacher's work!), the difficult provinces of the practical syllogism and conscience become relatively easy conquests. With regard to this pair of chapters (chaps. vi and vii) my own preference would be to put the practical syllogism before the chapter on conscience. To argue the point, however, is not my intention. Rather I mention it to show the book's adaptability to individual teachers' preferences. But its sound philosophical teachability is not the only thing which makes the first half of this book both adaptable and welcome. Every chapter of "Part One: Moral Principles" is accompanied by readings from St. Thomas. Thus the book is in this respect a source book as well as a textbook. It is important to observe that these texts are for the most part simply not found elsewhere in English. Obviously the student is not going to find them anywhere more conveniently. One is not expected to test or vouch for the accuracy of the translation in a review of this kind. But in using the texts I found no errors. This was not for lack of looking for them. Collecting, assembling, and translating texts for undergraduates is far

from the most pleasant and exciting task in a teacher's life. Every teacher will be profoundly grateful to the author for having done this job for him so generously and so well.

Part Two of this book ("Ethical Problems") is devoted to the matter usually treated in the second course in ethics. In other words, although it can be used otherwise, the book is designed to cover the work of two semesters. If one glances again at the price he will see that this is no trifling recommendation in itself.

It is in this part that some may see a departure from "tradition." Of course it is a return to the oldest and best tradition that we have. The true moral life is a life of integrated virtue; the complete and Catholic moral life includes the theological virtues; "and the greatest of these is charity."

This is not to say that there is confusion or that the man accustomed to distinguishing the philosophical from the theological disciplines will suddenly find himself in the wrong "department." On the contrary the author always makes the necessary distinctions sharply and well. But he has also remembered that nowhere more than in understanding the life of virtue is Christian wisdom false to itself if it presumes that to distinguish is to separate. The Catholic teacher believes that the moral life is the life of virtue. He also believes that a life of merely rational virtue is not enough. If he wants to teach as he believes this is the book for him. The paradox illustrated by the history of Christian philosophy will be repeated. His teaching will grow in clarity, in rationality, in philosophical insight.

For its depth and soundness, for its wealth of source material, for its useful and well chosen guides to further reading every Catholic teacher and student of ethics will be grateful for this book. That it is the final word on mooted points in Christian moral philosophy is not the author's contention. But it is and will be—such is the reviewer's contention—a guidepost and a means to a richer and fuller, a more rational and more Catholic moral life for our students. This makes it most welcome.

Charles J. O'Neil

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The Philosophy of Human Nature. By George P. Klubertanz, S.J. Revised edition. Saint Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1951. Pp. vii + 193. Paper (8½ x 11), $3.00.

Anyone teaching the Thomistic philosophy of human nature or

"rational psychology" knows how difficult it is to find a suitable textbook. Those available usually prove unsatisfactory because they fail to take into account pertinent data of experimental psychology and to meet modern problems; or, if they do, they fail to remain on the philosophical level and become at least in part manuals of experimental psychology. The achievement of Father Klubertanz is to have written a textbook of psychology which is completely philosophical and yet enriched with the findings of experimental psychology. Thus he has contributed to the renovation of his subject. Jacques Maritain has said that the philosophy of nature as a whole must be rewritten every twenty-five years if it is to remain living and vital. It is so close to the sciences of nature and depends on them so vitally for information that progress in these sciences requires a constant renewal of the philosophy of nature. Its guiding principles remain the same; but one's insight into them must be constantly deepened by contact with the empiriological sciences, and their data must continually furnish new material to be interpreted in the light of these principles. In writing his book the author has given us a good example of how this is to be done. He has followed the thought of St. Thomas, while adapting it to the understanding of modern readers and bringing it to bear upon the problems of our time.

The book is a revision of the author's *Notes on the Philosophy of Human Nature* (1949). The earlier edition has been completely rewritten and considerably enlarged. Among other things, numerous footnotes have been added which help to clarify the text. At the end of each chapter there is a brief summary of the contents in the form of definitions and proofs of the main points. Each chapter is also furnished with a list of readings in the works of St. Thomas and modern Catholic and non-Catholic psychologists. A judicious choice has been made in this bibliography, which will prove invaluable to both students and teachers. At the end of the book there are two groups of appendices. The first presents philosophical explanations of man other than the Thomistic, along with brief criticisms of them. The second is devoted to related issues, such as what the philosophy of human nature is, the scientific theory of evolution, the measurement of intelligence, freedom, hypnosis, and posthypnotic suggestions.

In this brief review it would be impossible to discuss the many interesting views of the author. I should like to consider simply one of them. He has devoted some introductory remarks (pp. 1-4) and a special Appendix (K) to the question, What is the philosophy of

human nature? The philosophy of human nature is regarded as not simply "a collection of points, some of which pertain to metaphysics, some to experimental psychology, some to the philosophy of nature" (p. 4, n. 3). It is a single and unified philosophical discipline, distinct from scientific psychology on the one hand and metaphysics on the other (pp. 175-77, nn. 8-10). Its distinction from scientific psychology is admirably demonstrated, chiefly on the basis of object, method, and aim. The author concludes: "When we consider the two knowledges at the level of organization and conclusion, there can be no direct comparison and consequently no conflict" (p. 176, n. 8). Nevertheless, there is a partial "material dependence" of the philosophy of human nature upon scientific psychology, for the latter furnishes the philosophy of human nature with evidences which are meaningful to it.

However, in determining the relation between the philosophy of human nature and metaphysics, conclusions are reached which would bear re-examination. The problem is too vast to be discussed adequately here, but at least several points can be stated. The philosophy of human nature is considered as a "potential part" of metaphysics, as entering into the analogical community of metaphysics as a secondary analogue, or again as a sort of particularized metaphysics (p. 176, nn. 9 and 3). It is doubtful, however, whether this notion of the philosophy of human nature is compatible with its distinction from metaphysics according to formal objects, although the author thinks it is (p. 176, n. 9). For if they are distinct according to formal objects they are distinct demonstrative habits, since habits are specified according to their objects (p. 172, n. 1). Now, the author sees that in his view of the philosophy of human nature it has no distinct demonstrative habit. There is only the habit of metaphysics which, when it deals with all being as being, is simply called metaphysics; and when that same habit is used on man's operations, nature, and being it is called the philosophy of human nature (p. 176, n. 3). But if this is true it does not seem possible to defend the distinction of the philosophy of human nature and metaphysics according to formal objects.

Moreover, it is recognized that if the philosophy of human nature is a "potential part" of metaphysics it must be classified with it and that they do not correspond to different degrees of abstraction (p. 177, n. 2). Now, even though it is true that "St. Thomas himself never spoke of three degrees of abstraction" and that the degrees are not sufficient to establish a classification of the sciences (*ibid.*),

still, St. Thomas clearly distinguishes between the mode of abstraction proper to metaphysics (called *separation* and effected through negative judgment) and the mode of abstraction proper to natural philosophy called *abstractio totius* and effected through apprehension).[1] The proposed concept of the philosophy of human nature does not take into consideration this important distinction.

The author's suggestion that ideally metaphysics should be studied before the philosophy of human nature (p. i) is consistent with his view of their relationship. He remarks that this sequence is successful in teaching philosophy (*ibid.*). Now, it may well be of help in teaching psychology to have students with some knowledge of metaphysical terms. It can be questioned, however, how much metaphysics students at that age can learn. Is it not true, as St. Thomas says, that "youths do not understand metaphysical terms with their mind, although they speak them with their mouth"?[2] Certainly, it was his ideal that metaphysics should be taught after all the other sciences, even after ethics, for metaphysics "transcends the imagination and requires a strong intellect."[3]

Finally, we may question the author's view that epistemology is an integral part of the philosophy of nature (pp. 176-77, nn. 9 and 1). By "nature" he means "essence as principle of being and activity" (*ibid.*). But surely knowledge is not a nature or essence in this sense. It does not seem that the philosophy of knowledge can be classed with the philosophy of sentient, human, and angelic nature. As he himself says, knowledge is immanent activity by which the knower is intentionally the thing known (p. 32, n. 38). Inasmuch as all things are knowable, epistemology studies all beings in relation to the knowing mind and it would thus appear to be a part of metaphysics.

These, however, are simply "related issues." The book as a whole is an excellent manual of the philosophy of human nature. Problems are presented clearly and solutions worked out in a forceful and convincing manner. The style is good, illustrative examples are well chosen, and difficult terms are always clearly explained. Students both in the classroom and among the wider reading public will benefit from it.

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[1] St. Thomas, *In Boethii de Trinitate*, 5. 3 (ed. Paul Wyser, O.P. [Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1948], pp. 38-41).

[2] St. Thomas, *In VI Ethicorum*, lect. 7 (ed. Pirotta, no. 1210).

[3] *Ibid.*, no. 1211.

A History of Modern Philosophy. By Frederick Mayer. New York: American Book Co., 1951. Pp. xii + 657. $5.25.

A History of American Thought: An Introduction. By Frederick Mayer. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1951. Pp. x + 399. $4.00.

Classic American Philosophers. Edited by Max Fisch. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951. Pp. x + 493.

Frederick Mayer is a very prolific writer. In addition to the two volumes now under review, he has published a history of ancient and medieval philosophy and a number of volumes in systematic philosophy. There are several routes open in the writing of a history of philosophy, so that each individual author's work must be judged according to its stated aim. In the Preface to his volume on modern philosophy, Mayer declares that he wants to make his textbook as comprehensive and intelligible as possible. For this end he includes discussions of social, political, and religious philosophy, as well as the more traditional themes, and makes frequent schematic outlines. Furthermore, he wishes to be as objective as possible, letting the student do most of the evaluational work.

In his first aim of comprehensiveness the author is successful. The book has an encyclopedic air about it: it touches on just about every modern philosopher and has a word to say about all the doctrines. This makes the book useful as a first reference work for students becoming orientated in modern thought. It is welcome to find a few paragraphs each devoted to such minor lights as Telesio, Herbert of Cherbury, Geulincx, Helvetius, and Unamuno. Furthermore, the brief chapters on Marx and Kierkegaard help to give a more balanced view of the nineteenth-century mind. But this comprehensiveness is achieved at considerable cost. It prevents the author from giving a detailed analysis of any major thinker, with the exception of Kant. In order to make a few observations on a philosopher's attitude toward religion, art, and politics, Mayer is forced to sacrifice fundamental discussions of his central positions, where guidance is most needed. Moreover, the great philosophers are given a merely topical treatment, despite frequent rest-period remarks on their general significance. The main inspiration and continuity of a philosophy are seldom captured. A typical case is the explanation of Hume's doctrine on causality, which is presented without reference to his theory of relations. Actually, Hume's causal

doctrine is entirely dependent upon the peculiar view he took of relations.

Depending upon their standpoint, readers are likely to judge differently concerning Mayer's second aim, objectivity. If one is thoroughly sold on "progress and modernity," then it will seem that the author has remained eminently fair and impartial. But if one's horizon includes a basic respect for some abiding truths in medieval philosophy and the Catholic faith, then the book will take on the aspect of a partisan plea against such truths. An amazing caricature of Ignatian spirituality is presented as sober historical fact, against the background of the liberating forces of the Renaissance and Reformation. Some equally amazing statements are made about medieval philosophy. We are told that "in the Middle Ages man was generally regarded as a creature of lust and wickedness, a mere infinitesimal being compared with the majesty of God" and that "the medieval Scholastics believed the existence of the soul was much more certain than the existence of the physical world, which to them merely represented an allegory and a symbol of God's providence." Coming from a historian of medieval philosophy, this nonsense can only be attributed to a firm resolution to see philosophy steadily through the eyes of current naturalism. Along the same line, the palm of being the founder of modern philosophy is awarded to Bruno rather than to Descartes, mainly because of the former's attitude toward religious traditions. Dogmatism and authoritarianism are marked as foes of philosophical intelligence, so that a sigh of relief is almost audible in these pages, once the transition to Kant has been safely made and the prospects of a nonmetaphysical philosophy are sighted. This is the type of "objective reporting" that is much more effective than an open polemic.

Most of the above remarks apply also to Mayer's history of American thought. A genuine effort is made to replace the philosophers within the wide context of social tendencies. But in making the story more concrete and lively, the distinctive nature of a history of philosophy is endangered. The Red Sox and the Ku Klux Klan, Theodore Dreiser and Woodrow Wilson, vie with the philosophers for attention and space. The reader is shown that philosophizing does not take place in a cultural vacuum, but there is little leisure to contemplate the philosophical mind at work. Mayer includes a good deal of trivia and some sermonizing on the eternal conflict between reactionary conservatism and progressive liberalism.

The need for leisurely study of our American philosophical tradition is met very well in *Classic American Philosophers,* edited by Max Fisch. This book of readings differs from the earlier anthologies of Anderson and Fisch, Muelder and Sears, in some important respects. The earlier collections aimed at providing samples drawn from all the periods of American philosophy, reaching from the Puritans to our own contemporaries. They provided useful companion volumes for general surveys of American philosophy. On the other hand, the excerpts were unavoidably brief and the total effect was apt to be far from unified. A new approach is taken in this latest source book. It concentrates upon what the general editor calls the "classic period" of American thought, extending from the Civil War to the Second World War. Within this span, our philosophy gradually came of age, assuming a mature and indigenous form of its own. The six great representatives chosen for this textbook are Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, and Whitehead. Max Fisch, the general editor, provides an informative general introduction, in which he discusses the personal relations among these six men, the climate of opinion within which they speculated, and the major tendencies in recent thought for which they are mainly responsible.

Each of the six divisions of the book contains a brief but pointed special introduction on the philosopher in question. Arthur Burks writes on Peirce; Paul Henle, on James; Otto Kraushaar, on Royce; Philip Rice, on Santayana; Gail Kennedy, on Dewey; and Victor Lowe, on Whitehead. The introductions on Royce and Whitehead are specially instructive. Each of the subeditors has annotated the section of readings for which he is responsible, mainly in order to clarify the text and supply further references. On the average, fifty pages of readings are assigned to each of the six philosophers. The selections are representative, long enough to give a fair hearing to each man and not too technical for the beginner. At the end of the volume, there is provided a bibliographical essay to serve as a guide for further study. This book is admirably suited for courses in American philosophy, giving the instructor the opportunity to introduce his students directly to the best minds produced so far in America.

James Collins

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Les Conversions de saint Augustin. By Jean-Marie Le Blond, S.J. Paris: Aubier, 1950. Pp. 321.

Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin. By Pierre Courcelle. Paris: De Boccard, 1950. Pp. 299. [$3.00]

St. Augustine's *Confessions* have that classic quality which attracts readers of quite diverse interests and mentalities. These two French studies take the *Confessions* as their points of departure, but they overlap on few conclusions. Father Le Blond, of the Jesuit Faculty of Theology at Lyon-Fourvière, has been known for his previous work on the logic of Aristotle. He brings to the study of Augustine an excellent knowledge of theology and philosophy and a kindly feeling for the spirit which animated the author of the *Confessions*. On the other hand, Pierre Courcelle, professor at the Sorbonne, is a classics scholar specializing in the literature of late Greek and Latin.

While Father Le Blond does discuss the "conversions" of Augustine (of faith, of intelligence, and of the heart), his book is really an interpretation of the *Confessions*. He maintains that it is a work with one theme divided into three parts: I, *Memoria;* II, *Contuitus;* and III, *Exspectatio*. He finds this theme in a sentence in Book XII.15. 18: "Exspectatio rerum venturarum fit contuitus, cum venerint, idemque contuitus fit memoria, cum praeterierint." Le Blond acknowledges his debt to P. Landsberg, who suggested this threefold division in an article written in 1936. The general idea is that the first nine books look back to the memory of St. Augustine's past life, the tenth book reveals the direct appraisal of the present, while the last three books look forward and beyond time to the eternal meaning of the story of Genesis. All of Father Le Blond's book is a working out of this theme.

Courcelle knows the theory which Landsberg advanced and the use made of it by Father Le Blond. But Courcelle is not convinced that the third term *(exspectatio)* is applicable to the allegorical commentary on Genesis which is found in the last three books. Perhaps the interpretation is somewhat strained, but this does not prove that it was foreign to the mind of St. Augustine. In any event, Courcelle is not much interested in the matter, for he undertakes a complete reinterpretation of the biographical section; that is, the first nine books.

In general, Courcelle is inclined to grant the historical veracity of the *Confessions*. His preliminary review of the large literature on

this question is most useful. His conclusion is that the account of St. Augustine's early life, as given in the *Confessions,* is reliable, but that it must be controlled by reference to the *Dialogues* and the historical and literary sources of Augustine's development. The interpretation eventually offered by Courcelle represents a cautious return to something like the thesis of P. Alfaric. These men think that St. Augustine went through several stages of mental development before becoming a true Christian. Neoplatonism is the most important of these stages. Courcelle's book has the merit of documenting the Neoplatonic influence of St. Ambrose on St. Augustine. That there was such an influence now seems beyond question; St. Ambrose was not only a channel of Stoic thought, but also of the views of Plotinus and Porphyry. Courcelle sees Manlius Theodorus and Simplicianus as important intermediaries in the same process. To my mind, the influence of Theodorus is overstressed. The effect of Courcelle's study is to suggest that though St. Augustine was sincere in entering the Church at the time of his baptism, he was for years as much a convert to Neoplatonism as he was to Christianity.

In the first part of his study, Le Blond goes over the same data. He is far from denying the strong influence of Plotinus and Porphyry on St. Augustine. But he seems to adopt Father Boyer's view that St. Augustine turned from the purely philosophical vision of Neoplatonism to the religious wisdom of Christianity very rapidly, that St. Augustine was beyond pagan philosophy at the time of his baptism.

This is an old dispute. Certainly Professor Courcelle's book is a scholarly, moderate, and valuable contribution to the argument. It is not lacking in appreciation of the eventual religious greatness of St. Augustine. Father Le Blond's work has less *Wissenschaft* but perhaps more perception in it. One can only make the obvious suggestion: read both books if you wish to penetrate the enigma of St. Augustine's personality.

Vernon J. Bourke

Saint Louis University

L'Existence de Dieu. By Michele-F. Sciacca. Traduction française de Régis Jolivet. Paris: Aubier, 1951. Pp. 219.

The present volume is one that produces in a Thomist a mixed reaction of sympathy with the general spirit of the author and with a large part of his book, together with a reluctant inability to accept his main thesis in its present form. It is a question, as may have been

guessed by those who have followed the other writings of the author, of the old Augustinian proof for the existence of God from eternal truths, presented in attractive modern form.

The author, editor of two youthful but already well-established reviews, the *Giornale di Metafisica* and *Humanitas,* is one of the leaders of the new group of Catholic spiritualist or neo-Augustinian thinkers which has recently emerged as one of the most important movements in contemporary Italian philosophy. This group, composed mainly of lay university professors, has offered the most effective challenge to date against the hitherto predominant idealism of Gentile and Croce. Realist in their philosophical outlook and sympathetic to Thomism on many points, they nevertheless draw their principal inspiration from the tradition of Augustinian spiritualism, especially as developed by Blondel and his school in France. The present volume, the contents of which first appeared as a series of articles in the *Giornale di Metafisica,* reflects well the general position of the group.

The construction of the book is well planned. It begins with an introduction showing the necessity of a genuinely metaphysical approach to the problem and the illegitimacy of the existentialist refusal to advance beyond a merely phenomenological description of existence to a metaphysics of being based on the synthesis of essence and the act of existence. Then follows a chapter carefully laying the groundwork of the proof by examining the meaning of the problem, the best starting point, and so on. Next comes the heart of the book, the demonstration of the existence of God from the presence of truth in the mind. The same basic argument is then applied to the sphere of moral values and the desire of beatitude. Other chapters follow, comparing the author's position with Kantian and other types of idealism, ontologism, empiricism, and the cosmological type of argument sponsored by Aristotelian Thomism. Two concluding chapters bring out admirably the necessity of a full commitment of one's whole spiritual life in the search for a solution to the problem of God's existence and the help given by faith in supporting and enkindling the intellect in the pursuit of its goal.

The best parts of the book—at least in the sense of those which seem to us to make the most solid contribution and against which we would have only minor qualification—are the two introductory and the two concluding chapters. The critique of existentialism for refusing to recognize the true structure of every existent as a synthesis of an act of existence with an intelligible determination or essence is excellent.

The second introductory chapter, "Position du problème et données réelles de l'hypothèse Dieu," also makes some excellent points, certain of which might well be taken to heart by Thomists for a more effective presentation of their own proofs. Chief among these is the insistence on the advantage of taking the "spiritual reality of man" as the concrete starting point in the mind's ascent to God. It is only by reflection upon his own spiritual nature that man is able to discern clearly the norm of perfection by which to judge the hierarchy of beings and to inject the positive note of spiritual personality into the otherwise vaguely indeterminate and impersonal concept of first cause. Since it will thus be necessary in any case to pass through man at some stage of the argument and since man is already in himself a microcosm mirroring the rest of the universe, why not place oneself at once in this chosen vantage point and start out from there? The insistence on this approach seems to us a point well taken and the best way to reach effectively the modern mind, so keenly alert to the difficulties involved in analyzing the once so apparently obvious "facts" of motion, causality, and so on, in the material world below us.

We come now to the heart of the book, the Augustinian proof for the existence of God from the presence in man's mind of absolute and eternal truths, especially (or exclusively—it is not clear which) the first principles. Here we find ourselves reluctantly forced to part company with the author, at least as regards the formulation of the argument which he presents, a formulation which is little more than a paraphrase of the original Augustinian exposition.

The ambiguities and inadequacies of the argument are substantially the same as those which have plagued the original Augustinian dialectic throughout its whole history, though St. Augustine as a pioneer had considerably more excuse than his followers for leaving them unresolved. Thus there is the same characteristic vagueness in merely affirming the presence of absolute truths in the mind without descending to any detailed analysis of just what these truths are, what their exact content is, and how they arise in our intellectual experience.

As a result, in typically Augustinian and Platonic fashion, truths as such are implicitly set up as quasi-absolute entities in themselves, and the argument proceeds oblivious of the fact that formally as truths they have only a relative intentional being dependent on their foundation in "the true" (as well as on the mind actively thinking them). But the true which founds the truth is nothing else but the real with a relation to the mind that has actively abstracted

or intuited it. It follows that any adequate analysis of a truth must always first trace it properties back to the true from which they derive and then pursue the analysis in the line of the real itself, showing that the being in question cannot explain by itself the traces of the absolute which it *de facto* bears within it.

Thus the author's Augustinian dialectic of truth, though ably presented, always seems to hover on the edge of a satisfactory demonstration but never to quite attain it. Thomists should, however, at least carry away this conviction from the book, that to be at all effective their own arguments must proceed within the strictly metaphysical perspective of finite and participated being as such and not merely on the thoroughly inadequate level of cosmological motion and causality.

W. Norris Clarke, S.J.

Woodstock College

The Primeval Atom. By Georges Lemaitre. New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1950. Pp. x + 168. $3.00.

This volume, which bears the subtitle "An Essay in Cosmogony," includes the text of conferences and lectures given by the author on a few occasions between 1929 and 1944. Taken as a whole, the text presents the author's argument in support of his hypothesis concerning the origin of our universe in the instantaneous explosion of a mighty, unique, primeval atom. The text proper is followed by an appendix of mathematical clarifications. There is a valuable preface by F. Gonseth, and a foreword by Professor H. N. Russell. The translation from the original French reads very pleasantly.

As an example of the detailed working out of a modern cosmogonical hypothesis, *The Primeval Atom*, despite the difficulties of subject matter, deserves the close attention of philosophers. No student who intends a career as a philosopher should fail to realize that part of the price to pay for the attainment of philosophical maturity involves a prolonged consideration of the epistemological character of the various sciences in their modern form. The study of cosmogonies offers an especially suitable field in which to carry on such a consideration, for the reason that cosmogonists nowadays are required to take into consideration the whole picture of nature which derives from the conclusions of the various empiriological sciences and because a well-constructed cosmogony is, one may say, the product, in the order of a mathematical reading of reality, of an intellectual quality which has some resemblance to what the philosophers call wisdom. Furthermore, the great men among the modern cosmogonists have,

inevitably it would appear, to reach beyond the epistemological limitations proper to scientific enquiry into regions which are familiar to the philosopher. An ironic situation occurs when it happens that the philosopher is unable to entertain a sustained conversation with the cosmogonists who have stumbled into his domain.

Professor Nagel remarks, in a statement which is printed on the back of the dust cover, that Abbé Lemaître's book raises central philosophic and logical issues. One example of this may be found in the discussion of the number of the stars on pp. 22-27. The author's argument for the finitude of the number of the stars runs as follows. He first introduces the notion of the "potential infinite" as exemplified in the regular sequence of numbers.

> As soon as we imagine the formation process of the numbers to have stopped, the sequence is ended. But our power to create numbers is not exhausted; the number which is actually finite is potentially infinite (p. 24).

The author then notes that the potential infinite is a point of departure for pure mathematics, which deals with "constructions of the mind which need not be set in actuality" (p. 24). The resulting transfinite numbers "evidently cannot help us to resolve our problem of the size of actual space" (p. 24). As against the potentially infinite, which means merely that the sequence of natural numbers is unlimited, the author sets up the definition of infinite number from the standpoint of cardinal number (this would be the actual infinite of Cantorian mathematics). Here, the comparison of two collections leads to the notion of their equivalence if their respective members can be associated in such a way that each member of the first collection fits one, and only one, member of the second collection, and vice versa. Thus, there are as many even numbers as odd numbers or again as many as there are whole numbers. The consideration of such "ideal collections" (p. 25) leads one to the following definitions:

> A collection is said to be a part of another collection when we get the first one by overlooking some member of the second. A collection is infinite when it is equal to one of its parts (p. 25).

The question of the number of the stars is then determined as follows:

> From the point of view of potential infinity, we must say that the number of possible stars is infinite. The number of the stars which could have come into being is infinite, but is the number of stars which really do exist now, or which will exist at some given time, finite? From the point of view of the cardinal number, we can say that the question of knowing whether the number of stars is finite or infinite

> reduces to knowing if the axiom that the whole is not equal to one of its parts applies to the assembly of the stars, the word "equal" being used in its usual and obvious sense which we defined a moment ago. It seems, then, that unless one of our most immediately evident axioms no longer applies beyond Sirius or Aldebaran, we must conclude that the number of the stars is finite (p. 26).

It is not clear that the conclusion, that the number of stars is actually finite, follows from the previous considerations. On the basis of our observation we know that the number of stars down to an assigned magnitude is finite, and on the same basis we know that there are other stars. We further know that our instruments reveal to us more stars again and that up to the present time there has been discovered no limiting fringe beyond which no more stars appear. Nor, it is conjectured, is there any immediate prospect of our piercing through the night sky to beyond the last star. The evidence is therefore that the number of the stars is, as far as we are concerned when we look at the stars, continually increasing. We do not know the totality, whether finite or infinite, as a whole. We know only collections which experience teaches us to regard as having been parts of the larger and later-discovered collections. As far as the quality of the collections is concerned we are no better off than would be a man who knew some prime numbers, was continually discovering other prime numbers, but did not know Euclid's theorem which states that the collection of primes is infinite. We could not conclude, in those circumstances, from a knowledge of the part to any certain conclusion about the whole. Presumably, Abbé Lemaître's argument is that since the transfinite numbers are ideal collections, they are not to be discovered in nature. Consequently, since in nature the law that the whole is equal to its part (which holds for the transfinite numbers) does not hold, then the law that the whole is not equal to its part, but is greater than it, does hold in nature, as common sense admits; but then the number of the stars is finite, not because the whole is greater than the part, but because the number of the stars is not transfinite. But the only reason given for saying that the number of the stars is not transfinite is that the ideal collections constructed by the mathematician do not apply to the actual world. But no proof of that is given. It does not appear that the question of the number of the stars can be resolved by observational methods, for even if we did pierce through to a region of space beyond the observed stars in which no further stars could be found, difficulties would still persist in the attempt to pass from the statement that there is an indefinite number of stars to the statement

that there is a finite number of stars. The question has to be answered from considerations of principle and law. It cannot be answered with certitude, on the basis of the distinctions introduced by Abbé Lemaître, unless the questions of the basis of the transfinite number and whether it is a being of reason or a possible being are answered. From the standpoint of St. Thomas, it is not repugnant to the absolute power of God to make an infinite multitude of beings exist in act, the reason being that the notion of an actual infinite multitude does not involve contradiction. Possible being, then, would appear to include the actual infinite multitude. This involves many difficulties for those who adopt a naïve approach to the principle that the whole is greater than the part. Much of the trouble derives from the ordinary faulty formulation of the principle. One is, in fact, required to admit that the principle "the whole is greater than the part" is not one of those first principles which are immediately attached to the principle of identity; and one may be inclined to think that it is not wise to give students the impression that the principle is the altogether solid rock that ordinary knowledge assumes it to be. As far as Abbé Lemaître's question concerning the number of the stars is concerned, it is true that he is right in seeking an answer to his question in the consideration of the infinite. It is true also that the question cannot be answered with certitude in an observational approach to cosmogony. The question, to be answered, requires that the cosmogonist reach beyond his own domain into philosophy. Philosophy can say that the number of the stars is finite not because it knows why the transfinite numbers are entities of reason, but because it knows the nature of real discrete quantity. But that is another story.

Brian Coffey

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Art and Beauty. By Maurice De Wulf. Translated by Sister Mary Gonzaga Udell, O.P. St. Louis: Herder, 1950. Pp. x + 213. $3.00.

Professor Maurice De Wulf, who died in 1947, was well known as a historian of medieval philosophy. He was not so well known, at least in this country, as an authority on aesthetics. Yet his first published work was entitled *La valeur esthétique de la moralité dans l'art* (Brussels, 1892); and throughout his long life he repeatedly gave courses in the philosophy of art or the history of aesthetics, on which subjects he also wrote much for publication. As far back as 1908 his reputation even in non-Scholastic circles was suffi-

ciently high to merit his being asked to write the articles on aesthetics and beauty in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* edited by J. Hastings.

The work here reviewed is based on a series of public lectures which the distinguished author gave at the University of Poitiers in France in the years 1915 and 1916; these lectures themselves were in part based upon the contents of a number of articles published previously in various learned reviews. It was not until 1920 that the complete set of lectures—more or less as given—appeared in book form under the title of *L'oeuvre d'art et la beauté.* A second, revised, edition came out in 1943 with the title of *Art et beauté. Conférences philosophiques.*

Art and Beauty is not, as might have been expected, a translation of this revised edition. The text, at least in good part, is based instead on the first edition. This does not appreciably lessen the value of the translation, however, since the discrepancy between the two editions is very slight. The main difference is in the arrangement of the material, and in this the translator has wisely chosen to follow the second edition.

The contents of *Art and Beauty* fall into two natural divisions: the first half of the book offers a positive, systematically presented, aesthetic doctrine; the second half consists of a number of critical and historical studies in aesthetics.

The first part of the book, then, which gives us De Wulf's own aesthetics, deals with such matters as the genesis and nature of works of art, artistic perception and emotion, and the purpose of the artist. Under one or other of these headings are treated, often all too briefly, other important questions such as morality and art, religion and art, and so forth. There is a special chapter (chap. iv) devoted to artistic order and another (chap. iii) on beauty in nature.

The second half of the book is, as we have said, critical and historical in nature. Chapters IX to XII (in both editions of the French original these appear as one long chapter) treat chiefly of certain recent aesthetic theories. These are criticized and, principally because of the subjectivism common to them, rejected. Chapters XIII to XV (in the French these constitute an appendix), on the other hand, discuss medieval and—to some extent, also—Greek aesthetic teachings. All these various studies in ancient, medieval, and contemporary aesthetics do not, even when taken together, approach a complete, organized history of aesthetics, and, moreover, are too sketchy to be of any great value individually. We may add that the essays on medieval aesthetics have been somewhat overshadowed by

the far more extensive recent researches of Edgar De Bruyne (though these are not yet available to English readers). Nevertheless, this latter half of *Art and Beauty* achieves its principal purpose, which is, doubtless, to throw added light on the author's own aesthetic positions.

Finally, speaking of the book as a whole, we should say that one must not be deceived by its semipopular tone. It is, we think, rather weak on the sheer metaphysics of beauty; but it abounds in deep insights into the philosophy of art and the psychology of the artistic experience, insights which are all the more precious in that they are as a rule lucidly expressed and happily illustrated. In conclusion, let us insist that De Wulf was no philosopher of the "traditional" type—cold, aloof, pure-intellect-with-no-imagination (a parody, to be sure, of the true philosopher); he was a man of fine sensibilities and a great lover of things artistic. We can say of *Art and Beauty* what he himself says of a work by Fromentin, "A genuine enthusiasm pervades this book."

From what has been said, it can be seen that *Art and Beauty* has a number of qualities that would fit it for use as a text in a college course in aesthetics. Although it is by no means ideally suited for this purpose, yet it seems to us a better choice than any of the other works on Scholastic aesthetics with which we are acquainted.

In a review of a translation, the quality of the translation itself may not be ignored. Hence, we are obliged here to note that the present translation is seriously wanting in accuracy, the errors averaging at least one to a page. These misinterpretations are often, of course, rather trivial in nature. If they were always so, it might be pedantic —and somewhat ungracious—not to overlook them; not infrequently, however, they render some idea of the author quite unintelligible or else—which is worse—they alter its meaning.

Thus, to give but two examples out of many others, the original French of De Wulf says (1 ed., p. 98; 2 ed., p. 65): "Un petit homme, si bien proportionné qu'il puisse être dans sa petitesse, ne sera jamais beau parce qu'il lui manque la grandeur voulue; il sera tout au plus gentil, gracieux." This is a quite free translation of a passage from St. Thomas (*In I Lib. Sententiarum,* d. 31. 2. 1), who is himself reproducing an idea of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. The translator renders the French as follows: "A small man, no matter how well-proportioned in his littleness, will never be beautiful for he lacks the proper height; he must compensate for it by being all the more gentle and courteous" (*Art and Beauty,* p. 52). Because, it would seem, of a mistranslation of *tout au plus,*

the whole sentence is given a new twist, one calculated to embitter all small men against St. Thomas and Aristotle, if not against philosophers in general!

To take the other example, in the original (1 ed., pp. 209-10; 2 ed., p. 221) we find:

> L'intellectualisme est renforcé dans le thomisme, en ce sens que les conséquences de cette doctrine, laissées dans l'ombre par Aristote et Plotin, sont ici clairement dégagées. L'une d'elles suscite quelque embarras au grand philosophe médiéval et elle touche à une difficulté qui traverse toute son idéologie.

In translation (p. 196) the passage is rendered as follows:

> Intellectualism is the foundation stone of Thomism, in the sense that the implications of this doctrine, left in the shadow by Aristotle and Plotinus, are there clearly defined. One of these brings to light an unsolved problem in the great medieval philosophy and touches on a difficulty which runs through the whole of its ideology.

Now, the context shows that the intellectualism which is here said to be intensified in Thomism is simply the tendency to stress the intellectual element in the aesthetic experience. It is this aesthetic doctrine whose implications are not developed by Aristotle and Plotinus, but only by St. Thomas. We say nothing of the other errors in this passage, except to note that *idéologie* would—according to the context—be better translated as "psychology".

We do not want to exaggerate these defects of the translation. A translator, even though he may read a foreign language with more or less fluency, is always in danger of making some such slips. Yet, it does seem that either the translator or the publisher should have provided a more careful check for possible errors in translation.

We are glad to add that the defects of accuracy in the translation are at least partially compensated for by the habitually excellent English of the translator. The book is not only written in idomatic English—which is more than can be said for many translations—but the translator's style is for the most part very agreeable, especially in its ability by means of an apt choice of words to catch the flavor of the specific and colorful language of the original.

Sister Mary Gonzaga says she is convinced that this translation will be welcomed wherever a serious attempt is being made to develop a valid aesthetics. For our part, we would say that her convictions are well-founded.

Scott Youree Watson, S.J.

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PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. By William Heard Kilpatrick. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951. Pp. 465. $4.75.

This book contains "the results of the author's thinking in connection with his life work of teaching philosophy of education." While he was teaching, Professor Kilpatrick thought it unwise to publish "any such inclusive statement of position." Now that he has retired, he states that he has not hesitated to say what he believes.

Professor Kilpatrick was a professor of education. If he had confined his book to Part II, "Philosophy of the Educative Process," one might have an honest difference of opinion with respect to some of the content, or perhaps even subscribe to a portion of it. Here, in any event, he is holding forth in his own domain, an educator writing for educators; and his views about curriculum-making (chap. xxiii), theories of learning (chap. xvii), interest (chap. xx), and school management and administration (chap. xxiv), have some association with his many years of experience as a professor in a college of education.

Professor Kilpatrick, however, does not restrict his book to the educative process (Part II); for in Part I, which consists of half the volume, he is eager to set down his views about the philosophy of life. It is in this portion of his work that he establishes his philosophic position, a type of pragmatic-naturalism or naturalistic-pragmatism. He has something to say about a great many philosophical concepts from the mind-body problem to the nature of value and scientific method; and much of his discussion oversimplifies and reduces the concepts of philosophy to absurdities. For example, he constantly reiterates the assertion that the old (*sic*) deductive method is completely erroneous and the new scientific (*inductive*) method is completely correct. He is altogether unaware of the importance of deduction for adequate induction; he has no conception whatever of the deductive nature of hypotheses and naïvely argues that facts somehow come together and establish the data of science. The title of the fifth chapter, "Change: Old Conception vs. New," illustrates the artificial bifurcations he continually invents.

It is indeed unfortunate that, Professor Kilpatrick's reputation in the field of education being what it is, he deemed it advisable to delve into a realm other than his specialty. One wishes that he had adhered to the book title literally and had produced *only* a philosophy of education.

WILLIAM S. KRAEMER

University of Arkansas

La Terminologia Tomistica dell' Interiorita. Saggi di metodo per un' interpretazione della metafisica della presenza. By Roberto Busa, S.J. Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1949. Pp. 280. Lire 1200.

Father Busa has made two trips to America to visit centers of Thomistic research in order to enlist the interest and co-operation of other scholars in his proposed complete *Index Verborum* to the writings of St. Thomas. He plans no ordinary concordance, but a huge listing of all uses of key terms in their various contexts, with information as to frequency, shadings of meanings, relations of passages, and so on. To this end he hopes to make use of mechanical devices employing some of the features of I. B. M. machines. He speaks in terms of an assembly of millions of cards. On the surface this rather mechanical approach is somewhat appalling, but anyone who will read this present work will see that Father Busa is neither a dreamer nor a mechanist.

His study is a very detailed presentation of the exact meanings of a number of terms denoting presence in, and action within, a subject. In twelve chapters he goes through selected passages in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* and the *First Book of Sentences,* chapters 64-70 of the *Contra Gentiles,* and question eight of the *Prima Pars.* The result is a very useful contribution to the notion of "presence" in Thomistic metaphysics.

When it is objected to Father Busa, in discussing his project, that many of the works of St. Thomas are still only available in faulty editions, he answers that his work will assist in the making of critical editions. The general value of the project is hard to estimate, but some American scholars may be inclined to assist in the work.

Vernon J. Bourke

Saint Louis University

The Development of Aristotle Illustrated from the Earliest Books of the Physics. By Howard Evan Runner. Kampen, Netherlands: J. H. Kok N. V., 1951. Pp. 160.

Here is an extraordinary book. We are given first a brief introduction to the problems of chronology which have exercised Aristotelian scholars during the last several decades and then an able summary of the contributions made toward a solution of them by Jaeger and Nuyens (pp. 11-36). Nuyens's improvements on the genetic method

are criticized as still insufficient on the ground that he does not achieve a unique and absolute criterion for dating all the writings of Aristotle, a universal criterion, that is, such as the author himself means to propose.

The method is then outlined which will allow of "a satisfactory and lasting solution." It is that of the author's mentor at the Free University of Amsterdam, Professor D. H. Th. Vollenhoven. The fundamental principle of all historical investigation in philosophy is described as follows. Since thinking human beings

> are governed in their hearts, and therefore radically and wholly, by the relation they bear to God, their philosophical activity is also determined by this fundamental factor of religion. [Consequently,] a proper interpretation of such writers will see them as men belonging to a particular time and milieu, both of which were religiously conditioned. The key to the problem of finding how the history of philosophy divided itself into periods is the history of the relation of philosophy to the divine word-revelation (p. 39).

The two basic attitudes toward this revelation are to acknowledge it fully and let it dictate all one's thinking, or to fail in this acknowledgment. The first attitude is not found expressed in the history of philosophy, but will presumably prevail when the approach of the Free University has been fully exploited. The three periods of the history of philosophy are varying expressions of the second attitude. First, there is the total failure to acknowledge and be guided by the divine word-revelation which characterizes ancient philosophy; second, there is the partial failure to the extent of synthesizing with it incompatible philosophical themes, which is the mark of Christian and medieval thought; and, third, there is the subsequent loss of contact with it in modern times (p. 40).

Now, since the ancients did not acknowledge the sovereignty of God, their philosophical conceptions had to be ruled by the things they did acknowledge: the cosmos, which they judged to be self-sufficient, or the law outside of the cosmos, which came to be absolutized. The second member of this primary division of ancient philosophy is realism, and to illustrate it the ideas of Plato are cited (pp. 40-41). The first, nonrealism, is further subdivided according to two unrelated sets of categories which can be expected to classify the philosophical interests of the ancients: subject *versus* object and universal *versus* particular (pp. 41-42). These are further subjected to numerous minor distinctions (pp. 42-47). As a result, when the divergent lines of categories are made to cross, enough

pigeonholes are provided to accommodate any and all of the ancient works and fragments, even to the least utterance of the Seven Wise Men or the darkling Heraclitus.

It is by the application of this system of categories to the *Physics* that the author hopes to come to "an interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus more in accordance with historical fact." And secondly, as he says, "this study is an attempt to test the usefulness and correctness of Vollenhoven's method" (p. 50).

Since the latter aim seems clearly to be as important to him as the other, a brief excursus on the background of the method might be to the point. Perhaps it is not as arbitrary and a prioristic as it appears in the author's sketch of it, but reference to an article on Plato's development does not change the impression[1]. In the same set of essays in which the Plato article appeared there is another which considerably clarifies the principles and techniques of the method. This was a contribution to the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy at Amsterdam in 1948 by H. Dooyeweerd, the rector magnificus of the Free University[2]. In a concluding note (p. 82), Dr. Dooyeweerd identifies himself and the Free University, where Professor Vollenhoven has been his colleague for many years, with "the philosophy of the *wetsidee* ['idea of the law']." In a few brief statements taken from this summary exposition of it, the "philosophy of the idea of the law" presupposes (*a*) the transcendental ego as the universal and necessary condition of every theoretical and synthetic act of consciousness (p. 78); (*b*) that self-knowledge is the sole way of discovering the true point of departure of our scientific thought (p. 79); (*c*) that the correlation between self-knowledge and the knowledge of God is accepted by all (pp. 79-80: reference is made to Aristotle, Kant, and Leibniz); (*d*) the self, the focal point of man's existence, is the religious heart of man seeking by innate tendency his divine origin (p. 80). As a result, religious motifs dominate the evolution of Western scientific thought by determining "the idea of the law"; that is, "the idea of the structural order of

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[1]D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, "The Course of Plato's Development," *Library of the Xth International Congress of Philosophy* (Amsterdam: L. J. Veen, 1948), II, 1-15.

[2]H. Dooyeweerd, "Introduction à une critique transcendentale," *ibid.*, 70-82. (This article is reviewed and reference is made to the same author's *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* [3 vols.; Amsterdam: Krank, 1935-36] by H. L. van Breda, "Une philosophie calviniste: La 'Philosophie de l'idée de la loi,'" *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, XLVII [1949], 279-83. See also H. Robbers, "De Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in Gesprek met het Thomisme," *Studia Catholica*, XXIV [1949], 161-71.)

reality, which is the transcendental condition of our every synthetic act of thought'' (*ibid.*). Finally, four types of philosophical mentality are noted, according to which of the four fundamental religious motifs has dictated the ''idea of the law'': the ancient religious motif, dominated by the dialectic of the matter-form motif; the Christian, which is concerned solely with the divinely revealed creation, fall, and redemption; the Catholic, whose controlling dialectic of nature and grace develops from the effort to reconcile Greek and Christian thought; lastly, modern humanism, which has been shaped by the dominant dialectic of nature *versus* freedom (p. 81).

Whatever the exact meaning of some of these phrases may be, we recognize in Dr. Dooyeweerd's summary, along with Professor Vollenhoven's classification of the periods of history, the point of departure of the Vollenhoven method. The first principle of this method, that man's ''philosophical activity is determined by this fundamental factor of religion,'' is contained in the identification of the ego at the same time with man's pursuit of scientific knowledge and with the innate striving of his religious heart toward God; its authorization to apply a priori categories to the work of any philosopher comes evidently from the same source, since the categories are generated dialectically from the contrary attitudes of the heart toward God.

With this background in mind one turns with misgivings to the proposed application of Professor Vollenhoven's method to the *Physics* of Aristotle. A definite chronology of the development of Aristotle's thought is the ambitious aim which the author sets himself. To succeed in this attempt would be to demonstrate the value and validity of Professor Vollenhoven's method—and with it to establish the truth of the philosophy upon which it rests.

The author begins with Book VII of the *Physics* as the part of that work most likely to be Platonic, according to the views of most commentators (pp. 56, 57). Having explained away the only text Jaeger had advanced in proof of Aristotle's Platonism at this time (and with it ''our most compelling reason for assigning Book VII to the time when Aristotle was still Plato's pupil''), he finds the marked ''influence of the Platonic theory of an intelligible world behind the continuously changing world of phenomena.'' For Plato this background is twofold, the ideas and the numbers; Aristotle held to the numbers even after rejecting the ideas. But in this text Aristotle makes no reservation—''in all cases where a particular occurs, the knowing faculty knows the universal by means of it.'' There is no doubt, therefore, that this passage is very old, dating back to the

time when the background of reality for Aristotle included the ideas (p. 67).

But isn't this the sort of statement one might find in the latest works of Aristotle? Nuyens's dating of the *De Anima* as very late, for example, is approved (p. 32). Now, in the third book of that work, chapters five to eight, a number of explicit texts testify to the same doctrine that in the particulars there is intelligible form, which is known as such upon the presentation of the particular and can be henceforth predicated universally of the particular. When Aristotle says, for instance (*De Anima* iii. 232a 2-6), "Since according to common agreement there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz., both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things," how is this incompatible with *Physics* vii. 247b 6-7: "When the particular occurs, it knows the universal somehow by means of it"? It is to be noted, besides, that the Bekker text reads, "When it meets with the particular object, it knows in a manner the particular through its knowledge of the universal," which, if the knowledge is taken as the recognition in a particular of a universal known from past experience, leaves the Platonic reconstruction with no ground here whatever.

Much is made of the Platonic realism evidenced in the same seventh chapter, 247b 13-248a 6, by Aristotle's comparison of the original acquisition of knowledge with an awakening from sleep: "This is Platonic realism expressed in a manner worthy of the master himself" (p. 68).

But the point of the whole of chapter three is stated clearly in its opening sentence—245b 3-6: alteration requires sensible causes, and it occurs only in things which are in themselves affected by sensible things—"as is clear from the following considerations." At the end of the chapter—248a 6-9—this theme is repeated in much the same words. In the course of the chapter Aristotle excludes from those things which are alterations or are achieved by alteration such states as are essentially fixed, acquired states of body or soul, and finally the states of the intellectual part of the soul. The reason he gives explicitly or implies in each instance is the impossibility of there being alteration with respect to substance, to alteration itself, or to anything else which has no contrary (see the explanation of this matter in Book V, chap. ii, especially 225b 10-24, to which Aristotle refers).

It is within this context, it is to be noted—see 247b 9-13—that

Aristotle emphasizes the necessity of stability, completeness, and rest in the act, if there is to be intellectual knowledge at all; most of the commentators remark on the etymological connection between *epistēmē* and *stēnai*. This emphasis is perfectly natural, and so is his illustration of the same characteristic of intellectual knowledge (that is, lack of alteration) by comparing the possession of knowledge in a reawakening to it from sleep or drunkenness with the first acquisition of knowledge. The point is, as Cornford remarks, that the acquisition of knowledge is not a process of qualitative modification, although it involves a modification of bodily organs. There is question here only of the immaterial character of the act of knowledge itself, not of the way in which the intellect comes to know, and even less of the nature of the objects of intellectual knowledge. The author does not prove, therefore, that Aristotle is here presupposing or referring to a world of separate ideas. Nor, since this is the basic text in his reconstruction, does he prove that Book VII is either Platonic or very early.

A few additional indications of the procedure followed in assigning "pre-Aristotelian doctrines" and consequently an early date to *Physics* vii will serve sufficiently to show how literally the author means this to be an application of Vollenhoven's method to a section of the Aristotelian corpus. According to Professor Vollenhoven's thesis, realism (which puts the law outside the cosmos and absolutizes it) develops from universalism (in which universals alone exist or are primary) to individualism (in which the individual is primary) through partial universalism (wherein both exist by equal right). Now Aristotle must be shown to be in this intermediate stage. We are brought back to the text by which Aristotle's realism was proved, the evidence that he held not only a real world of universals but particulars along with them. Thus his partial universalism is proved (pp. 69-70).

Another Vollenhoven category is even more easily verified. Book VII is an example of cosmogono-cosmological thinking; that is, it is not purely scientific in its analysis of the world, but is still concerned with its genesis. It must, therefore, date from early in Aristotle's career. This the author demonstrates (*a*) from Aristotle's use of terminology characteristic of the ancients in his description of the various kinds of motion (247b 7-12: lumping motions as either combination or separation he uses *suggkrisis* and *diadrisis,* which are to be found in Empedocles and Anaxagoras); (*b*) from a passing reference to generation and corruption (he mentions them only to

exclude them from the present consideration of strict motion, at 243b 9-10); and (*c*) from the use of *genos,* which is, after all, connected with *gignesthai* and therefore betrays his cosmogonical bent (pp. 70-71).

The monism which Vollenhoven considers characteristic of Protagoras and the pre-Socratics is found exemplified in one of Aristotle's arguments against Zeno, in 250a 24-25—"for no part even exists, except potentially, in the whole." Taking this to mean that the whole alone exists originally before there can be any parts, the author concludes to a monistic doctrine in *Physics* vii. The correspondence of this to Vollenhoven's characterization of Protagoras suffices to date the book as early (pp. 71-72).

Whether the exemplification is a single word or phrase or a series of texts, and whether the texts are critically authenticated or reconstructed by conjecture seems not to matter greatly. The Vollenhoven categories systematize the history of pre-Aristotelian philosophy as it must have evolved. All that need be done to mark the stages of development in Aristotle's thought is to point out how the system is verified in the text of his works.

The following pages of this crucial section of the book relate *Physics* vii to the *Theaetetus,* the *Sophist,* and the *Statesman* of Plato's later years by listing texts and themes in those works similar to the ones dug out of Aristotle (pp. 79-80). Then a similar relationship is established with two or three Aristotelian fragments which Jaeger pronounced to be early (pp. 80-81). The conclusion follows: Book VII is the earliest portion of the *Physics,* having been composed within a few years of the later Platonic dialogues.

The remaining three chapters deal with those books of the *Physics* which, according to the new categories verified in them, are shown to belong to the earliest non-Platonic years. They treat in order Book I, which exhibits "the anthropological theory of interaction"; Book II, "the zoological theory of interaction"; and Books V and VI, "the phytological theory of interaction." These books mark a shift of Aristotle's philosophical interest from man to animals to organic beings (cf. p. 44). Since, according to the Vollenhoven method, Aristotle's development must follow this order, there is no difficulty in finding texts to suit. Nor is it surprising that in the first two of these chapters numerous and sometimes lengthy passages are classified as later insertions, usually for no better reason, apparently, than that the doctrine they contain is not consistent with the categories which are being verified in that particular book.

It may well be that *Physics* vii dates from very early in Aristotle's career and mirrors a Platonism not yet outgrown. It is quite possible that this rearrangement of the books of the *Physics*—vii, i, ii, v, vi, iii, viii—represents approximately the true order of composition of the *Physics*. But whatever the internal order of the work may be, or the meaning of Aristotle's achieved doctrine for that matter, the procedures used in this study are less likely to help than to hinder an objective search for the truth.

There are, surely, excellent textual analyses and acute and helpful comments on particular texts, but this sort of work hardly fulfills the promise of solving the problems of Aristotelian chronology by the application of the Vollenhoven method. So many factitious and ill-explained categories are applied that the reader is left with the conviction that they are used quite arbitrarily and with less regard for their rigorous verification in the text than for the completeness of a prearranged inventory.

Perhaps some of the author's conclusions will contribute toward the solution of Aristotelian chronology. If this is the case, it will hardly be in virtue of the synthetically unified criteria proposed by Professor Vollenhoven, but because Aristotle's treatment of particular problems can be shown to have developed from one part of his work to another. In short, the promise for the future suggested in this work, in spite of its criticism of Nuyens, may well be realized in the sort of extension of the problematic approach to internal criticism which Nuyens himself outlined and invited.

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Philosophy of Nature. By Jacques Maritain. Translated by Imelda C. Byrne. To which is added "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," by Yves R. Simon. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. x + 198. $3.00.

Reading through Imelda C. Byrne's translation of Maritain's *La philosophie de la nature* (Paris: Téqui, 1935), the difficult task of the scholar attempting to put the philosophical expression of one of the Latin languages into intelligible English becomes quite evident. Until a strictly English philosophical language is developed, we must be satisfied at times with circumlocutions and direct verbal translations. Short of rewriting the whole book, this translator has done one of the best jobs presently possible.

The problem of the philosophy of nature comes down to us "fraught

with historical implications and complications" (p. 2). Maritain's first chapter outlines the positions of Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle on the philosophy of nature, then shows how—with Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Kant—"physico-mathematical knowledge was mistaken for a philosophy of nature" (p. 36). The second of Maritain's three chapters describes the step from physico-mathematical knowledge substituted for the philosophy of nature to the positivist's complete denial of any philosophy of nature as the logical consequence of the Cartesian break-away.

The third and core chapter contains Maritain's statement of the Thomistic position on the philosophy of nature. After a discussion of approach and method, he arrives at the definition: "The sphere of intelligibility proper to the philosophy of nature is therefore *ens secundum quod mobile, sub modo definiendi per intelligibilem quidditatem (et non per operationem sensus), seu sub lumine ontologico*" (p. 140). This chapter also contains Maritain's statement of the relation of the philosophy of nature to present-day physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. The fourth chapter in this present edition gives Yves Simon's commentary on Maritain's position, which first appeared in the Maritain volume of the *Thomist* (1943). Dr. D. A. Gallagher's selected bibliography which follows is pertinent and helpful.

The well-thought-out plan of this volume is directed toward the ever widening number of students and laymen interested in philosophy and its relation to modern science. To this number, however, a word of warning must be injected at this point. Maritain's *Philosophy of Nature* does not contain an uncontested exposition of the Thomistic position. In this light I think it important to restate a major criticism of Maritain's work given by Father L.-M. Regis in his review "La philosophie de la nature: quelques 'apories'" (*Etudes et Recherches, Philosophie,* I [Ottawa, 1936], 127-56).

In the beginning of Chapter 3, Maritain describes "two ways of constructing concepts and analyzing the sensible real" (p. 73). He gives them the following names: "the one, the empiriological analysis: the other, the ontological analysis of sensible reality" (p. 74). For Maritain, physics in the broad sense comprehends both analyses, with modern science using the empiriological analysis and the philosophy of nature the ontological analysis of physical reality. Now, it is true that few can read the descriptions of these analyses without acknowledging them as counterparts of their own thinking; but the point that Father Regis raises is that Maritain in

his "ontological analysis of sensible reality" is in truth describing a mental process proper to metaphysics (*op. cit.*, 143).

In any event, the discovery of the division of the sciences is not had by a priori definitions; but, through the power of the mind to reflect upon its own actions as well as on those of its related faculties (St. Thomas Aquinas, *In III Sent.*, 23. 1. 2 ad 3), we come from the experience of these various types of scientific judgments to their understanding and verbal descriptions. First we must see if there is a special habit of mind required for assent to propositions generally classed under the philosophy of nature; then we must make the further analysis of how this class of judgments differs from the other more easily discernible classes, such as mathematics and metaphysics.

Throughout this volume we are in contact with a very great thinker, and we are introduced to the method of approach in our attempt to recognize and understand the philosophy of nature. But the gap between the clear starting point that "physical knowledge terminates in the sensible" (p. 24) and a final definitive separation of the philosophy of nature from the other sciences is, in this writer's opinion, still left unspanned.

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The Psychology of Sartre. By Peter J. R. Dempsey, O.F.M. Cap. Westminster: Newman Press, 1950. Pp. 174. $3.00.

Because existentialism reveals itself more as an attitude toward life than as an ordered system of philosophical principles, concepts, and criteria, it has presented a confusion of somewhat formidable proportions to the Scholastically trained mind that would seek to probe beneath the surface of its amorality or the bawdy superficies of its literary expression. Father Dempsey's analysis of the Sartrian psychology represents an admirable step in this direction. For he divides his study into two carefully distinguished parts. In the first, he anatomizes Sartre's psychology, dissecting the sources, the philosophies, and the phenomenology which made him what he was—and he does this in Sartrian terms, in existentialism's own laboratory, as it were. The second part of Father Dempsey's investigation takes advantage of the clarity established in the first part and, on that basis, translates the Sartrian psychology into its equivalent terms in Scholastic philosophy. Thus his critique has the value of meeting a modern author on modern grounds and yet of uncovering his inadequacy in the light of the over-all philosophical picture.

The chief works of Sartre meticulously analyzed are *L'Imagination, Esquisse d'une Théorie des Emotions, L'Imaginaire, L'Etre et le Néant,* and *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme.* References are made to some literary works, especially the essay on *Baudelaire*—to show the psychoanalytic parallel between the poet and Sartre, both men dominated by their love for their mothers—and *La Nausée,* which might be called the novelized version of *L'Etre et le Néant.* The great merit of *The Psychology of Sartre* lies in this, that the author culls the key concepts: liberty, anguish, the void, being-for-itself (the famous *pour soi*), and being-in-itself (the equally famous *en soi*); and he demonstrates what each means in the context in which Sartre uses them. He is, in this case, serving as a Sartrian commentary on Sartre; or, better, explaining Sartre to Sartre. The relationship of these concepts to Sartre's concept of human reality helps to illustrate and, above all, isolate notions and ideas that are all too frequently lost in the lush prose in which they are hidden.

Having mined out the intrinsic meanings of Sartre's fundamental concepts, Father Dempsey then places them side by side with the Thomistic psychology; in fact, he practically makes a comparison of texts between Sartre and St. Thomas's *De Anima, De Veritate,* and the psychological section of the *Summa,* Part I. Consciousness, the unconscious, the imaginative process, all the steps that lead to knowledge are examined; and Sartre's inception with the Cartesian *cogito* as influenced by Husserl's phenomenology is shown to have led him into the inconsistency of identifying consciousness with knowledge and dismissing perception as mere probability. "If perfect knowledge, *connaissance,* be equated with intuition, and intuition with the immediate consciousness of things in themselves, how can M. Sartre differentiate consciousness and knowledge, or dismiss perception as mere probability?"

Father Dempsey applies the same method in the study of the relationship between cognition and emotion, and finally to the meaning and value of the concept of freedom. This is of the essence of Sartre's existentialism. "By the use of his liberty a man creates his essence. Existence in man precedes essence. Liberty and existence are one. Between the existence of a man and his being free there is no difference. One is condemned to exist, condemned to be free." From this *terminus a quo,* Father Dempsey proceeds to the clarification of the confusion caused by considering appetency as a form of cognition, thus inextricably involving the two orders hopelessly. He sees the modified truth in which liberty and its use or abuse can

affect or influence the formation of personal qualities and character. But there is a vast difference between the appetitive life of an animal and that of a human. Rationality can be, is, the basis for human freedom.

All in all, Father Dempsey's book recommends itself to everyone who would have a clearer and deeper understanding of Sartrian psychology in the light of the psychology of the *philosophia perennis.*

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Being and Having. By Gabriel Marcel. Translated by Katharine Farrer. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951. $2.25.

The Mystery of Being. By Gabriel Marcel. Vol. I, "Reflection and Mystery," translated by G. S. Fraser; Vol. II, "Faith and Reality," translated by René Hague. "The Gifford Lectures"; Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951. Each volume, $3.75.

In the Introduction to his *Journal Métaphysique,* published in 1927, Marcel wrote that the diary of his metaphysical meditations was not originally intended for publication, but only as personal notes in preparation for a "dogmatic work" which would present his philosophical ideas in a systematic form. He had soon become more conscious of his inner repugnance to systematic exposition, however, and also of the hypothetical character of many of his reflections. Accordingly he put off the program of an organized and complete philosophical work to the indefinite future.

The two works here under review represent on the one hand the continuation of Marcel's metaphysical journal and on the other, in the case of the "Gifford Lectures," the most systematic exposition of his ideas to date, and perhaps the most systematic one can expect from his pen.

Being and Having appeared in French in 1935 and includes a metaphysical diary covering the years 1928 to 1933, a lecture on the phenomenology of having, and three lectures on the questions of faith and religion. There is a special interest for the Catholic and Thomist in the diary of this period, for it covers the days of Marcel's conversion to Catholicism and offers some notes on his efforts to study the catechism of the Council of Trent and Thomism (apparently in the works of Garrigou-Lagrange). Both caused some wrenching of his spirit, which found it difficult to give over com-

pletely the habits of thought of his past philosophical idealism. On June 26, 1929, he wrote: "I feel that I am today rid of whatever traces of idealism remained in my philosophy. I feel exorcised (by the influence of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's book on God, though it is very far from satisfying me completely)." In a later entry on the proofs of the existence of God, he finds the essence of Thomism in the realist thesis of intentionality: thought is essentially of the other, or, rather, thought is ordered to being as the eye to light.

The ideas of the diary and the accompanying essays are taken up and restated in the course of the "Gifford Lectures." They can be treated as one.

It may be a teacher's oversimplification to say that there are two ways of philosophy. The variety and individuality of philosophical approach to truth defies any facile division. And yet it generally happens that in describing a philosopher one ends by saying that he is Platonic or Aristotelian. It would be misleading, I think, in addressing an audience of Scholastic philosophers, to say that Marcel is Platonic rather than Aristotelian, even though the statement would be true. The Scholastic would tend to think of Plato in terms of a doctrine which stands in contrast to the doctrine of Aristotle; that is, as another Aristotelian except that he teaches the wrong doctrine. It would be better, therefore, to compare Marcel with Augustine, because in Augustine it is the method and the approach that stand out more than the doctrine.

It is, in fact, curious how many resemblances there are between Marcel and Augustine, especially since Marcel gives no evidence of any special interest in the great Latin father of the Church. Marcel's philosophical acquaintanceships seem to be drawn almost exclusively from the immediate present or the recent past. Josiah Royce and Bergson, Husserl, Heideggar, and Jaspers people his background. Sartre frequently enters as someone to be rejected. Spinoza seems to have been an early and lingering attraction. But art and science and literature, his own dramas, offer a point of departure for philosophical reflection as often as do the technical philosophers.

It would be impossible to follow the lines of the argument of *The Mystery of Being* in any summary way because, as Marcel himself remarks, the method is part of the argument; the lectures are a search, an investigation into truth, a characteristic which in itself is an echo of the Augustinian *inquisitio, indagatio veritatis*. But an attempt might be made to give the essence of these lectures by saying that they affirm a specific method and a basic doctrine. This is, in a

sense, indicated by the subtitles of the two volumes: "Reflection and Mystery," "Faith and Reality."

The method is designated by Marcel as the method, or instrument, of "secondary reflection." One will not find a clear statement of what secondary reflection is, but only some examples and its application in practice. It would seem to be a process of reduction not to the meaning of one's concepts and judgments, but to the original, preconceptual intentions of consciousness involved in these concepts and judgments. It bears the marks of Marcel's early idealism corrected by Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. It might not be correct to call it a method of immanence; it does not compare with Blondel, for example. But it is a method of finding the object in the interior subject. In the Introduction to his *Journal Métaphysique,* for instance, Marcel has written:

> Without doubt one can legitimately claim that in metaphysics to conclude is always to make explicit a certain pre-conscious content, present in some manner to thought in advance of all the argumentations which seem to embody it (p. x).

In *The Mystery of Being* he explains that it is like the process of memory which, when one has lost something, goes back over the route until it finds the moment when the article was first lost from sight.

This obviously bears comparison with Plato's characterization of philosophical thinking as reminiscence; but in the actual practice it is more closely allied to St. Augustine in the *De Trinitate* seeking to find the mind's knowledge of itself in itself before it actually and explicitly knows itself, and the knowledge of God again within the mind itself at the very point of departure of the mind's search for God. It seems to me that there is an essential similarity between these three (Plato, Augustine, and Marcel). They all conceive philosophy as a search, but a search which will find what it wants at the beginning, not at the end, a re-search.

It is this method of return to the original intentions of consciousness implicit in, and anterior to, all concepts and images which leads Marcel to the essentially Platonic and Augustinian notion of truth as an intelligible light or background. It is likewise this method which inevitably leads him to be dissatisfied with Thomism, with any philosophy which attempts to settle any question in terms of conceptualizations and mediate arguments. Consequently, we find him in the "Gifford Lectures" building a natural theology not on

the basis of reason and causality, but on the basis of the root intentionality of faith, hope, and charity. It is rather startling to hear of a natural theology built on a natural faith independently of a demonstration of God. One quickly thinks of the fideist theology of the non-Catholic world which believes in God precisely because it cannot demonstrate his existence. There are some grounds for comparison here, it is true, for Marcel thinks of faith more naturally in terms of belief as Bain would define it, or in terms of Newman's real assent. But that is as far as the resemblance goes. Marcel does not base his faith on a need of our nature; it is not a question of desire. Rather his faith is a basic perception of our consciousness of a transcendence, a perception which antedates all effort at reason, and in fact explains it. Perhaps Marcel would object to the word "perception," since it implies the direct *grasping* of an object. For the same reason "intuition" would not do. Rather it is a case of "intention" in Husserl's sense of "meaning an object." Again, comparison with Augustine suggests itself; it is like the Augustinian faith which precedes all understanding. In this analysis the operation of reason implies a basic faith, confidence, trust. The rational search for God has its point of departure in a preknowledge of him which is identical with the spirit's knowledge of itself as a gift (as an "image," in Augustine's language).

But even this faith is not the beginning. It itself is rooted in an awareness which spirit has that it does not exist in isolation, but rather that it is a member of a community (the influence of Royce is apparent here), a community of the family or the race, but principally a community which has God as its other member. This is the basic doctrine of intersubjectivity. All of Marcel's analyses lead back to this doctrine and find their last explanation in it. The doctrine of intersubjectivity implies that the sense of community is not something which is derived from the front, from the object, something which comes after knowledge, but rather something which is found at the background out of which spirit, or consciousness, the subject, projects itself. For Marcel, solipsism is not a problem that arises after one has put down the principles of one's philosophy. It is something that is refuted from the beginning, for at the deepest recesses of the conscious self there is found not complete isolation, but rather communication. Marcel translates it as charity. It is the foundation of the ontology of spirit. And therefore Marcel calls his philosophy a "philosophy of spirit" and says that "it is towards a realism of mind that all our line of thought is directed"; and we

should add that these words can attain their full significance only in the light of intersubjectivity; that is, of love (II, 156).

That this, too, is in the spirit of Augustine is obvious. There is perhaps one major difference; and that is that Augustine never completely shook off all the signs of his early Platonic dualism of mind and body, whereas Marcel goes far in the other direction, perhaps too far. His reflections on the implications of being and having (I am my body; I have a body) as applied to his own existence lead him to a fundamental correction of Descartes in the direction of the Scholastic idea of soul as form of the body and should likewise offer a foundation for a distinction between them, and perhaps in the final analysis do so; but this is not clear.

In fact there is little that is "clear" in Marcel. This is intrinsic to his method and his aims. He requires much patience of his reader, even in the excellent English translations given us by Katharine Farrer, G. S. Fraser, and René Hague. The patience and labor of reading him, however, are not without fruit, for he is not superficial. He has much to say that is revealing and stimulating. It is still a question, nevertheless, whether he has sufficiently overcome his origins in idealism. Husserl's own history has proved that his doctrine of intentionality by itself is not sufficient to solve the idealist dilemma. Though Augustine found his source of truth in the interior of man, he took his point of departure in exterior perception. And even then human nature felt the need of fulfilling or complementing Augustine by the sort of objectivist philosophy that Aquinas gave it. Unless one shows that there is not merely an "intention" of being and of God, but also an intuition of them (and Marcel does not seem to have wanted to do this), there is always going to be a need of objective demonstration, of mediate proof rooted in intuitive first principles and developed by means of concrete perceptions. If it is true that there are two ways of philosophy, the Platonic and the Aristotelian, the Augustinian and the Thomist, it seems also to be true that Plato must be completed by Aristotle and Augustine by St. Thomas. They cannot stand alone.

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HEREDITY EAST AND WEST. By Julian Huxley. New York: Henry Schuman, 1949. Pp. x + 246. $3.00.

Heredity East and West is a contribution by Julian Huxley to the debate about the agent or agents of evolutionary change which, during the last ten years, has clarified some of the reasons for the opposition of politically acceptable Russian scientists living in Russia (together with a number of foreign colleagues) to what we may as well call democratically acceptable scientists living outside of Russia (together with some unfortunate politically unacceptable Russian scientists).

Using old, familiar terms, we might say that the debate opposes those who hold a Darwinian theory of evolution to those who hold a Lamarckian theory of evolution. In more modern terms, the opposition is partly expressed by saying that Lysenko and his followers would make evolution depend upon the supposed inheritance of acquired characters, produced by the effects of changed environment upon the heredity when it is in a peculiarly plastic state, while Huxley and those who have the same general scientific attitude would ascribe variations originating in the hereditary constitution to *mutations*. *Heredity East and West* presents the purely scientific debate as to the well-foundedness of the opposed views with the clarity which marks Huxley's expositions of such matters. But the book goes much further than that by situating the scientific debate between opposed theories of evolution (some modification of a Lamarckian attitude may yet find a permanent place in the future biological theory of the changes at the level of living being which take place in nature) in the much wider and truly desperate struggle which, in the understanding of secular minds, opposes Marxist slavery to democratic liberty. Huxley covers many aspects of this wider issue, with very full and valuable reference to documents which are not easily accessible to the public, and he does this without any display of the emotion which made the reading of Professor Muller's articles in the *Saturday Review of Literature* (Dec. 4 and 11, 1948) on the same subject such an embarrassment for the reader. One can agree with Huxley that the actions and methods of Lysenko and his masters are intellectually and socially deplorable, that the scientists who still live in free societies should be at pains to grasp the issues of principle which have been raised in connection with the very nature of science and that they should draw the right conclusions for the intellectual and social amelioration of the temporal human condition from the whole villainous affair which, like so much else the Marxists

have had a hand in, stinks of murder. (The present reviewer is convinced that the Marxism of Lenin and Stalin is also essentially, including the terrorism, the Marxism of Marx. He is thus also convinced that Marxism is one discovery that the Russians did not make with absolute priority.) *Heredity East and West* is a valuable book, both for the objective presentation of scientific facts which it contains and for its value as a document for the study of the scientific attitude of the democratic. What one deplores, of course, is the fact that Huxley himself should still be swayed, in his ultimate determinations of judgment, by that naturalistic bias which is not a prerequisite for the correct pursuit of experimental science. He shows no sign, as yet, of having departed from the attitude which underlay his masterly account of the modern biological theory of evolution as presented in *Evolution: The Modern Synthesis.* There (p. 27) he declared that the theory of evolution which he proposed to develop was "still Darwinism in the sense that it aims at giving a naturalistic interpretation of evolution." This naturalistic bias reappears in *Heredity East and West,* where the vision is wholly restricted to the temporal order, as if Marxism was not the ultimate Thule of naturalism.

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The Logic of Liberty. By Michael Polanyi. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. viii + 206. $4.00.

This volume is not, as the reader might assume, a development of the author's article "Logic of Liberty," which appeared in *Measure* (Fall, 1950). It is instead a collection of ten essays, all published before, of which the *Measure* article is one—entitled in this volume "Perils of Inconsistency." The essays are held together by the author's interest in liberty in the contemporary world. The first six deal with the freedom of the scientist, the last four with social freedoms, especially the freedom of the businessman from government control.

The central theses of these essays can most easily be understood and judged if the reader remembers that Polanyi was formerly professor of physical chemistry at the University of Manchester and is now professor of social studies at the same university. Both as a scientist and as a citizen Polanyi has for many years taken an active interest in this problem of freedom in the contemporary world. He was one of the founders of the Society for Freedom in Science,

and he has written three books on various aspects of state planning and free trade.

The six essays concerned with freedom in science argue that although technology or applied science can operate under the dictation of either industry or government, by its very nature pure science cannot thrive unless it has full autonomy and a liberty limited only by the scientific community itself. Applied science is quite properly annexed to factories and government bureaus; it admits of outside planning because its ends are set by the requirements of the state, of industry, or of some agency outside the field of science. Pure science, on the other hand, finds its home only on academic soil; because its aim is the advancement of knowledge it cannot accept planning or dictation from outside authority. One of the six essays is devoted to showing the inherent contradiction of "planned science."

Two of these essays—"Scientific Convictions" and "Foundations of Academic Freedom"—deserve special attention. The former holds against positivists that

> whichever way we turn we cannot avoid being faced with the fact that the validity of scientific statements is not compellingly inherent in the evidence to which they refer. Those who believe in science must admit, therefore, that they are placing on the evidence of their senses an interpretation for which they must themselves take a distinct responsibility. In accepting science as a whole and in subscribing to any particular statement of science, they are relying to a certain extent on personal convictions of their own.

The scientific community is held together, Polanyi shows, by its joint acceptance of the same fundamental beliefs. These form "the constitution of the scientific community and embody its ultimate general will." If such a group of beliefs is denied, as Polanyi shows is the case with positivists, then there is logically no way of denying the state the right to select its own assumptions and on their basis to dictate to scientists as it would to artists or sociologists.

> The true antithesis is therefore between the State and the invisible things which guide men's creative impulses and in which men's consciences are naturally rooted. The general foundations of coherence and freedom in society may be regarded as secure to the extent to which men uphold their belief in the reality of truth, justice, charity and tolerance, and accept dedication to the service of these realities. . . . For if truth is not real and absolute, then it may seem proper that the public authorities should decide what

> should be called the truth. And if justice is not real and absolute, then it may seem proper that the government should decide what shall be considered just or unjust. Indeed, if our conceptions of truth and justice are determined by interests of some kind or other, then it is right that the public interest should overrule all personal interests in this matter. We have here a full justification of totalitarian statehood.

In the last four essays the author attempts to apply the norms and conclusions arrived at from "the example of science" to social matters. Here he works out a case for liberty which is mathematically tighter than the arguments of Hayek or von Mises or Lippmann, but there is question in this reviewer's mind whether the conclusions are any more valid. Polanyi argues that the polycentricity of tasks in economic life makes central planning a physical impossibility and that "there exists no radical alternative to the capitalist system" of a self-regulating market economy. These conclusions may or may not be right. But the point here is that Polanyi has arrived at them by analyzing social phenomena in the same way that the chemist studies atoms and molecules. In this respect his work strikes the reader as an abrupt return to the Ricardian tradition. The author is now amplifying and developing these theses in the Gifford Lectures given by him this year in the University of Aberdeen; it is hoped that such refinement will improve his arguments by using a methodology proper to the task.

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DEKADENZ ODER FORTSCHRITT. By Joachim Seyppel. Schlehdorf: Bronnen-Verlag, 1951. Pp. 64.

VOM HELLSEHEN. By Heinz Schlötermann. Schlehdorf: Bronnen-Verlag, 1951. Pp. 79.

DAS PROBLEM DES RELATIVISMUS. By Hermann Wein. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1950. Pp. 126. DM 7.50.

The first of these works bears the subtitle "A Study of the American Philosophy of History." The author examines a number of American writers (and his sampling is fairly complete) and finds a whole range of theories from a crass belief in necessary material progress to Spenglerian pessimism and even a nonevaluative theory of mere change. He decides that America is culturally an aged nation because American psychology is behaviorism (p. 62), and that it must develop a Spenglerian philosophy of history. The book's main defect lies

in the author's scanty acquaintance with American thought (exemplified in his misapprehension about American psychology).

Vom Hellsehen also bears a clarifying subtitle, "An attempt to Explain Suprasensible Appearances." The author declares that the methods of experimental science have proved unavailing and asserts that philosophy can at least give the outlines of an explanation. After presenting a brief outline of the Kantian position (as he understands it), he proceeds to develop it by identifying the Ego, the world, and God, referring frequently to Goethe as an authority. On the basis of the a priori, clairvoyance and similar phenomena are said to be perfectly normal; spiritualistic phenomena are, however, flatly rejected.

Hermann Wein considers epistemological relativism. He is willing to grant that naïve absolutism of truth has been overthrown by the criticism of the relativists. But he points out that relativism in turn is a naïve position and that concealed underneath it is a simple idealism. He traces the origins of the relativism of truth in the areas of physical knowledge, history, and theology, and the kindred relativism of good and evil. He shows that attempts to escape relativism have been made in the direction of biology ("animal faith"), of history, the state, and psychology.

Wein then proposes the problem: How can we preserve the advantages of the relativistic critique of absolutism without falling into idealism, power pragmatism, and kindred pitfalls? He argues that there is a third position between absolutism and relativism; namely, the recognition of relations, especially that of "man's situation in the world." It is somewhat difficult to discover what the "absolutism" is which Wein rejects; there are times when he seems to include under this vague pejorative designation absolute idealism and all of pre-Kantian philosophy. Hence, though his critique of relativism is effective up to a point, his positive suggestions are vague, generic, and disappointingly meager.

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The Thought of C. S. Peirce. By Thomas A. Goudge. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1950. Pp. xii + 360. $5.00.

Comparing himself unfavorably with William James, Charles Peirce once described his own mind as being "a mere table of contents, so abstract, a very snarl of twine." Later students have appreciated

the accuracy of this self-characterization. The table of contents is still being painfully deciphered, the abstractions pondered, the snarl of twine unraveled. A number of years ago Justus Buchler highlighted the methodological and empiricist side of Peirce's thought. More recently Paul Weiss and James Feibleman have given us a Peirce who is more of a systematist and metaphysician in the grand manner. Inevitably, the pendulum has now started back in the general direction of Buchler's interpretation. When Thomas Goudge first began his studies in Peirce, he thought that a coherent system of thought could be extracted from the mass of articles, notes, and unfinished projects constituting his tangled philosophical remains. But the closer his acquaintance with the subject matter, the more unlikely became the goal of presenting the ideas of Peirce in perfect order and consistency.

Indeed, Goudge advances the contention that, far from constituting a systematic whole, Peirce's speculations are harried by an essential conflict. He calls the two poles of this state of tension "naturalism" and "transcendentalism," thus combining the two views of Peirce which previously prevailed. But Goudge makes a double affirmation about these two strains of thought: first, the relation between them is one of mutual antagonism; secondly, the naturalistic current is the more genuine and fruitful one, as far as the general advance of philosophy is concerned. Consequently, Goudge's study must be evaluated both as an exposition of Peirce's philosophy and as an elaborate attempt to establish this double thesis about the opposing principles. Of course, the exposition is framed to bear out the dual thesis; but at least a partial separation is possible in weighing the achievement.

As a historical account, Goudge's book recommends itself in several ways. It adheres closely to the text of Peirce's writings, makes frequent and apposite quotations, and conveys a remarkably clear conception of the leading principles. After an opening chapter on the nature of inquiry in general, the book examines Peirce's views on mathematics, phenomenology, logic, metaphysics, ethics, and theology. The explanations are suited to introduce the reader to the Peircean universe of discourse and to call attention to his relations with other philosophers. But the entire discussion is governed by the two propositions mentioned above, which are not established with the same success. Goudge erects a series of antitheses between (*a*) scientific method and feeling, (*b*) the interdependence of theory and practice and their separation, (*c*) conceptual precision and cultivated

vagueness, (*d*) the rejection and acceptance of "Platonic universals," (*e*) the use of nonpersonal versus highly personal categories in the study of nature, (*f*) repudiation of a priori reasoning and its extensive use, (*g*) support for, and attack upon, the systematic ideal, and, finally, (*h*) respect for common sense and deliberate disdain for it. These antitheses constitute an expansion of the fundamental opposition between naturalism and transcendentalism respectively, with naturalism on the side of the angels and transcendentalism saddled with a highly suspicious set of tenets. Goudge attempts to disarm his critics beforehand by observing that this distinction between naturalism and transcendentalism is not meant to describe two historically ascertainable positions or to serve as a principle of separation among the sheep and the goats. But, in fact, the distinction does function this way throughout the book. The main question is whether these antitheses can be applied, even as descriptive terms, to the philosophy of Peirce in order to provide a general interpretation. The contrast is a neat one, but too neat to serve as an over-all frame of reference for understanding Peirce's mind. He did not intend his ethical and religious views to flaunt common sense, nor did he regard his metaphysical generalizations as sentimental and vague dreams. It is a circular procedure to assign certain metaphysical statements to the realm of naturalism, on the ground of their precision, and banish the rest to the limbo of transcendentalism.

Specifically, Goudge never establishes his assumption that there is a fundamental antagonism between Peirce the logician and Peirce the metaphysician and ethician. He is prone to read conflict into texts where Peirce is talking about different levels and zones of investigation. His astonishment that Peirce can entertain both a logical and an ethical viewpoint within the same essay or paragraph springs from his own overruling antithesis between naturalism and transcendentalism rather than from a contradiction in Peirce's own mind. This tendency to see internal warfare everywhere flows from a philosophical disagreement with Peirce for not accepting the primary naturalistic dogma of the monism of philosophical method and objects. This becomes apparent in the second half of Goudge's thesis; namely, that the naturalistic aspect of Peirce's mind is far stronger and more influential and worthwhile than the transcendental aspect. Not the text of Peirce, but a general philosophical standpoint and evaluation of contemporary tendencies dictates this judgment. Goudge regards the metaphysico-ethico-religious investigations of Peirce as survivals from America's transcendentalist past, whereas his logical

and semiotical studies belong in the main stream of present-day thought. Granted his tremendous influence in these latter fields, it would be taking a deliberately restricted and short-range view to place Peirce's contributions to "transcendental" metaphysics and ethics in a lower rank. That the speculations labeled "transcendental" are expendable relics is precisely the point at issue among students of Peirce, not a fact obvious to everyone.

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Le Concept de monde chez Heidegger. By Walter Biemel. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Paris: J. Vrin, 1950. Pp. 184. $1.20.

Martin Heidegger's philosophical reputation has taken some decidedly curious turns during the past two decades. During the thirties his philosophy achieved considerable vogue in Germany and even seemed to have official sanction for a while. During World War II he was listed unfavorably by most foreign writers as one of the prime agents of the Nazi movement. Then he was assigned responsibility for the atheistic existentialism of Sartre. Nevertheless, direct students of his thought have persisted in seeing in it something more than a political attitude and something quite different from an atheistic or nihilistic outlook. His doctrine is very difficult to understand, so that we are grateful for any careful expositions of his views. Through the quiet persistence of Louvain scholars like Alphonse De Waelhens and Walter Biemel, the true lineaments of his system are gradually being uncovered. It is likely that these efforts at understanding his doctrines will lead to some thorough revisions of the common opinion about his position among the existentialists.

Biemel was a personal student of Heidegger. In the present monograph he utilizes not only Heidegger's recent books, but also several unpublished series of lectures delivered at Freiburg University. He concentrates his analysis upon one major pillar of Heidegger's philosophy, the theory of the world. It holds a central position, because Heidegger defines man as an existent having his being in the world. He distinguishes between the way in which nonhuman things are gathered together spatially within the world and the distinctive presence of man in the world. Man does have a spatial aspect that includes him along with other things, but he is also able to understand his orientation in the world, according to its own essential structure. Heidegger's main work, *Being and Time,* was concerned

with the various modalities of man's mundane existence, especially as revealed in time and the attitude of care. Biemel gives a detailed account of these investigations, but points out that most of Heidegger's critics went astray in taking these views as Heidegger's final word. Actually, Heidegger intended the problem of the world to lead back eventually to the problem of being. In his more recent essays he remarks that man's being-in-the-world is but one dimension in man's total relation to being and the truth of being. Biemel's study is a definite aid toward grasping Heidegger's own mind rather than the phantoms which have been masquerading under his name. Only after his authentic doctrine is accurately known, can any effective criticism be attempted.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
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ANSHEN, RUTH NANDA (ed.). *Moral Principles of Action: The Ethical Imperative.* New York: Harper & Bros.; April, 1952. $7.00.

APPLEBY, PAUL H. *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press; April, 1952. $4.00.

ARISTOTLE. *Works of Aristotle.* Vol. XII. Ed. by Sir David Ross. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; spring, 1952. $3.00.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Confessions of St. Augustine.* "Cardinal ed.," 27; New York: Pocket Books; March, 1952. 35c

BAKER, HERSCHEL. *The Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; March, 1952. $6.00.

BALZ, ALBERT G. A. *Descartes and the Modern Mind.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; March, 1952. $10.00.

BARNETT, LINCOLN. *Universe and Dr. Einstein.* "Mentor Book"; New York: New American Lib.; March, 1952. 35c

BAUMGARDT, DAVID. *Bentham and the Ethics of Today.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; April, 1952. $7.50.

BAUMOL, WILLIAM J. *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. $4.25.

BENTHAM, JEREMY. *Bentham's Book of Political Fallacies.* Ed. by Harold A. Larabee. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; May, 1952. $4.50.

BETHELL, S. L. *Cultural Revolution of the 17th Century.* New York: Roy Publs.; March, 1952. $3.50.

BLACK, MAX. *Critical Thinking. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method.* 2d ed., "Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series"; New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Pp. 476. $5.00; text ed., $3.75.

BODKIN, MAUD. *Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 196. $2.50.

Boehner, Philotheus, O.F.M. *Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to ca. 1400.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Feb., 1952. Pp. 140. $3.00.

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Butterfield, H. *History and Human Relations.* New York: Macmillan Co.; April, 1952. $3.50.

Carnap, Rudolf. *The Continuum of Inductive Methods.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Jan., 1952. Pp. 96. $3.50.

Cassirer, Ernst. *Philosophy of the Enlightenment.* Tr. from the German by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 379. $6.00.

Cohen, Morris Raphael, and Cohen, Felix S. *Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951. Pp. 960. $8.50.

Copleston, Frederick C. *Medieval Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; April, 1952. $2.75.

Curti, Merle Eugene. *The Growth of American Thought.* 2d ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1951. Pp. 928. $6.00.

De Castro, Josué. *The Geography of Hunger.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co.; Feb., 1952. $4.50.

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Dewey, John. *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays.* New York: Peter Smith; Jan., 1952. $3.75.

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Ficarra, Bernard Joseph. *Newer Ethical Problems in Medicine and Surgery.* Foreword by Very Rev. Francis J. Connell. Preface by Most Rev. John King Mussio. Westminster: Newman Press. Pp. 188. $3.75.

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Fitch, Frederic Brenton. *Symbolic Logic: an Introduction.* New York: Ronald Press Co.; April, 1952.

FOSTER, ALFRED L. *Ring-logics and P-rings.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1951. Pp. 11. Paper, 25c

FRANKFORT, W., and OTHERS. *Before Philosophy.* "Pelican Books," A198; New York: Penguin Books, 1952. 65c

FREEMAN, EUGENE, and APPEL, DAVID. *Great Ideas of Plato.* "Library of Great Ideas Series"; New York: Lantern Press; Feb., 1952. $3.00.

FRENCH, THOMAS M. *The Integration of Behavior.* Vol. I, *Basic Postulates.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Feb., 1952. Pp. 292. $5.00.

FREUD, SIGMUND. *Totem and Taboo.* Tr. from the German by James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952. Pp. 182. $3.00.

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GREEN, ALWIN WIGFALL. *Sir Francis Bacon: His Life and Works.* Denver: Alan Swallow, 1952. Pp. 311. $4.00.

GUENZEL, LOUIS. *Medical Ethics and their Effect upon the Public.* New York: Vantage; Jan., 1952. $2.00.

HADAS, MOSES. *A History of Latin Literature.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. viii + 474. $5.00.

This well-written textbook mentions the philosophical doctrines of Latin classical writers (from Lucretius to Augustine), but only briefly and as a minor issue. Cicero receives the most objective treatment; Lucretius is obviously a favorite of the author's; St. Augustine's philosophical doctrines are mostly omitted, and his philosophy of history, which is mentioned at some length, is treated with very little sympathy.

HEXTER, J. H. *More's* Utopia: *The Biography of an Idea.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; June, 1952. $3.00.

HUGHES, H. STUART. *Oswald Spengler. A Critical Estimate.* "Twentieth Century Library." New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1952. Pp. ix + 176. $2.00.

This book combines a biography with an account of Spengler's thought. Though the main analysis is devoted to the *Decline of the West,* Spengler's political doctrines are also considered, as well as the relations between Spengler and national socialism, and between Spengler and later historical writing. There is an excellent chapter on the cultural and historical backgrounds of the Spenglerian theses. The book is pleasant reading, except that exposition and criticism are mingled in a sometimes disconcerting fashion. Some of the critical judgments of the author are not unexceptionable. Spengler's cultural relativism is given unqualified praise, and no distinction is made between relativism as a technique of historical analysis and as a system of metaphysical and ethical judgments. Moreover, the author seems to have somewhat of an anti-Christian bias; it is this, apparently, which moves him to deny any real over-all unity in human history.

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JORDAN, E. *Essays in Criticism.* With an introd. and synopses by Robert

D. Mack. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. vii + 384. $7.00.

The essays in this volume touch on major points of criticism. The topics covered are language, experience, imagination and metaphor, literature and culture, genius and taste, poetry and metaphysics, art and morality, art and reality, and the nature of poetry. The author is deeply concerned with combatting the unfortunately too current subjectivism, relativism, historicism, and psychologism in their relation to criticism. He deals vigorously with these tendencies and scores many a point against them. His own positive point of view seems to be a modified Kantianism which makes use of a priori categories. He insists that in addition to the categories of speculative thought there are also distinct concepts of value logic.

JORDAN, VIRGIL, and HAZLITT, HENRY. *Freedom in America.* Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers. Pp. 32. 25c

JOUVENAL, B. DE. *Ethics of Redistribution.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Feb., 1952. $1.75.

KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN, ERIK VON. *Liberty or Equality.* Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1952. Pp. x + 395. $6.00.

This book deals with certain aspects of the philosophy of liberalism and the democratic form of government. After a brief introductory chapter of definitions and principles, the author takes up the historical backgrounds of present-day democracy and totalitarianism. He next studies the shortcomings of the democratic form of government, and compares it with monarchy. Then follow three chapters on some historical antecedents and present temper of European nations, with a view to forecasting the probable success or failure of democracy on the European continent. There are some eighty pages of notes and a very full, detailed index.

The author's thesis, in brief, is that democracy of itself cannot long safeguard the true liberty of all citizens; his argument draws on a wide variety of sources. [*To be reviewed*]

LANE, ROSE WILDER. *Give Me Liberty.* Caldwell. Idaho: Caxton Printers. Pp. 62. 50c

LAPLACE, PIERRE SIMON. *Philosophical Essay on Probability.* New York: Dover Pubns.; Feb., 1952. $2.50; paper, $1.25.

LEIBNIZ, G. W. *Theodicy.* "Rare Masterpieces of Philosophy and Science Series"; New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Feb., 1952. $6.50.

LILLIE, W. *Introduction to Ethics.* New York: British Book Centre; March, 1952. $2.75.

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MANNHEIM, K. *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; spring, 1952.

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MAYER, FREDERICK. *Essentialism.* New York: Russell F. Moore Co., 1951. Pp. 223. $2.75.

MCCULLOCH. *Finality and Form.* Springfield: C. C. Thomas; May, 1952.

Mediaeval Studies, XIII. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951. Pp. 300. Paper, $7.00.

The 1951 volume presents many excellent studies, of which some are of more than ordinary philosophical value. The first article,

"The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)," by N. M. Haring, is an investigation into the logic, metaphysics, and theology of Gilbert. The very advanced Gilbertian logic of the *id quo* is presented clearly and with careful reference to sources. This article should do much to restore interest in Gilbert.

Ulrich Leo's "The Unfinished *Convivio* and Dante's Rereading of the Aeneid" (pp. 41-64) deals partly with the development of Dante's thought and partly with literary and historical considerations. "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," by Armand Maurer, C.S.B., (pp. 165-76) is a historical and textual study that is valuable both from the historical and the philosophical points of view.

Among the shorter notes, three are of philosophical interest: "Maimonide et la Philosophie de l'*Exode*," by Etienne Gilson (pp. 223-25); "Did Robert Grosseteste Attribute the *Hexameron* of St. Venerable Bede to St. Jerome?," by J. T. Muckle, C.S.B., (pp. 242-44) and "*Ipsa Philosophia Christus*," by J. Rochais, O.S.B., (pp. 244-47).

MESSNER, J. *Ethics and Fact: The Puzzling Pattern of Human Existence.* St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.; spring, 1952.

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MONROE, WALTER S. *Teaching-Learning Theory.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press; March, 1952. Pp. 440. $6.50.

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PALMER, CECIL. *The British Socialist Ill-Fare State.* Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers; May, 1952. Pp. 704. $6.00.

PARSONS, TALCOTT, and SHILS, EDWARD A. *Toward a General Theory of Action.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 518. $7.50.

PAUL, SHERMAN. *Emerson's Angle of Vision: Man and Nature in American Experience.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; May, 1952. $4.50.

PEIFER, J. F. *Concept in Thomism.* New York: Bookman Associates; April, 1952. $4.00.

Philosophy of Communism, The. Introd. by Charles Boyer, S.J. New York: Fordham Univ. Press; distributed by Declan X. McMullen Co., 1952. Pp. x + 308. $5.00.

This book, a translation of *La Filosofia del Communismo* (Turin: Marietti, 1949), contains the papers read at the meeting of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas in Rome, April 19-24, 1949. In addition to the Introduction, there are twenty-three papers by as many authors, Italian, French, and German. The papers follow no definite order, but Fr. Boyer indicates the main points which were treated: Communism as an atheistic system whose horizon is limited to temporal goods, the denial of private property, and totalitarianism; the hypertrophy of the state and its interference in law, family life, labor, international relations, and scientific inquiry; Marxist theory as an exaggeration of the importance of economic functions; the Communist concept of class; and the inadequacy of legal and economic measures to bring about a new type of man. Finally, several papers stressed the difference between Communist and Christian views of man, and upheld spiritual values. Unfortunately, there seems to be little realization of the real roots of Communism;

Marxist ideology is mistaken for profound philosophical analysis and is "answered" accordingly; some papers seem to be conservative to the point of being reactionary. (To this book a serious student of Communism can apply the remarks of Douglas Hyde, in his article-review of a similar work. See his "The Real Answer to Communism," *Blackfriars*, XXXIII [February, 1952], 67-73.)

There is no index.

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PIEPER, JOSEF. *Leisure—the Basis of Culture.* Tr. by Alexander Dru, with an introd. by T. S. Eliot. New York: Pantheon Books, 1952. Pp. 169. $2.75.

The two essays in this book—the title essay and "The Philosophical Act"—were selected to serve as an introduction to the thought of a prominent contemporary German thinker. Dr. Pieper is a follower of St. Thomas Aquinas in a fashion distinctively his own; his sociological studies and his excellent though informal essay style combine to give his work some affinities with that of Cardinal Newman.

The title essay asserts that the bourgeois utilitarian point of view is the enemy of culture, for, in extolling *useful* work, it implicitly destroys all true ends and values. The author argues further that true leisure, and consequently true culture, is dependent on a religious point of view and on a cult or external manifestation of religion.

"The Philosophical Act" treats of philosophy as an element in culture and in relation to a religious faith. The author amplifies and deepens the notion of wonder as the beginning of philosophy. His discussion of the relation between philosophy and faith takes an interesting turn when he says, "'How is a Christian philosophy possible?' is a far less difficult question to answer than the question 'How is a non-Christian philosophy possible?'—assuming, always, that we understand by philosophy all that Plato understood by it" (pp. 154-55).

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THOMPSON, R. MOTSON. *Nietzsche and Christian Ethics.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1951. Pp. 104. $2.75.

This book, first published in Great Britain, is apparently an academic thesis. It has a three-fold aim: to present and evaluate Nietzsche's criticism of Christian moral ideas, to criticize Nietzsche's own moral ideals, and to evaluate Christian moral ideals. The author's treatment of these topics is philosophical (in the sense of "philosophy of religion"). Inasmuch as the so-called "scientific" or "naturalistic humanism" has adopted some Nietzschean ideas, the book is of contemporary as well as of historical interest. The author's own religious position seems to be that of a moderately liberal Anglican.

Thought Patterns, Vol. II. Brooklyn: St. John's University, 1951. Pp. 80.

This is a series of short papers, all but the fourth of which were delivered as lectures at St. John's University. These are the titles and authors of the papers: "Psychology and Human Relations,"

by Very Reverend Francis J. Connell, C. SS. R.; "Psychology and Divine Love," by Reverend James F. Coffey; "Psychology and Spiritual Exercises," by Right Reverend Monsignor John S. Middleton; "Beauty in Aquinas and Joyce," by Frank L. Kunkel; and "St. Vincent de Paul and the Mystical Body," by Very Reverend John P. McGowan, C.M. Extreme brevity combines with the necessary superficiality of a lecture to make this slim volume free of any permanent value. The paper of Professor Kunkel, which is somewhat meatier, has already appeared in the *Thomist*.

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This doctoral dissertation studies the relation between evidence and certitude (Part I), the evidence of principles and conclusions (Part II), and the evidence for other kinds of knowledge, particularly internal acts, induction, and sense knowledge (Part III). These doctrines are discussed by way of a detailed analysis of texts from Scotus. When reference is made to other thinkers, secondary sources seem to be relied on too heavily. This strange statement is made about Aristotle: "For Aristotle the only legitimate way of concluding to universal propositions by means of experience is that which proceeds through the enumeration of all particular cases" (p. 136).

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